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INTRODUCION
Certain features of the war on terrorism impose novel and contro-
versial punishment schemes. For example, President George W.
Bush has unilaterally invoked executive authority to detain thousands
suspected of terrorism over protracted times and to create military
tribunals. The government has imprisoned two American citizens,
denying them access to counsel for more than a year, and it has in-
carcerated 650 individuals without process at Guant~inamo Bay. Bush
administration officials recently announced that they would try some
Guantinamo detainees in military commissions; however, these bod-
ies will accord fewer protections than the civilian system or even
courts-martial under the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice.
The federal judiciary has differed about the government's power
to confine those incarcerated. A three-judge panel on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sustained one citizen's
detention and acquiesced in the President's designation of him as an
enemy combatant. However, two Second Circuit judges ruled that
the executive possessed insufficient authority for holding another
citizen so designated. A D.C. Circuit panel unanimously found the
court lacked jurisdiction over many Guantdinamo detainees, yet two
Ninth Circuit panel members entertained a petition for a writ of ha-
beas corpus which one prisoner filed. The Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari on the Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuit opinions,
and it may well review the Ninth Circuit appeal, even though the Jus-
tices declined to hear several cases that involve the war on terrorism.
Indefinite detentions and military tribunals warrant legal, policy,
and theoretical criticism. As general matters, the practices under-
mine the rule of law domestically by violating fundamental tenets in
the United States Constitution and overseas by flouting established
international law precepts. The actions specifically contravene sepa-
ration of powers among the federal government's tripartite branches,
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as well as infringe on essential rights of persons held and the defen-
dants whom military commissions will try. The conduct also resem-
bles other nations' behavior that America has vociferously criticized.
The war on terrorism, thus, has fostered the creation of disputed
punishment regimes that do not account for their impacts and that
overemphasize security vis-;I-vis liberty. These ideas, especially Su-
preme Court willingness to address the most important litigation pit-
ting national security against civil liberties in half a century, illustrate
that punishment and the war on terrorism merit scrutiny, which this
Article undertakes.
The first section descriptively assesses the new, contested punish-
ment systems the Bush administration has used to fight the war on
terrorism. I then explore the benefits and costs of the measures
whose principal functional justification is national security, but de-
termine that the techniques are not responsive to their adverse con-
sequences. For instance, the regimes may have enhanced security yet
have undercut detainees' civil liberties and will compromise the
rights of individuals prosecuted before the military tribunals. In
short, the detriments, namely which relate to civil liberties, outweigh
the advantages, particularly the ones that implicate security. The war
on terrorism's continuation will exacerbate this ratio, as the govern-
ment detains, and military commissions try, more people. The third
section, accordingly, proffers recommendations for the future. Illus-
trative is using federal courts or international tribunals, not military
commissions, to prosecute defendants accused of terrorism. These
options would reduce authority's concentration in the Executive
Branch, will undermine civil liberties and global relationships less,
and could protect security as much.
I. DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT
The origins and development of the unique and controversial
punishment schemes that the Bush administration has implemented
while responding to the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes deserve
limited treatment here, in part as that background has received
analysis elsewhere.' Nonetheless, a comparatively thorough evalua-
tion is warranted because this should increase appreciation of
I See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) (analyzing the different
treatment by the Bush administration of non-citizens and citizens in the wake of September 11);
Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Militay Commissions, Interna-
tional Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002) (discussing the Bush admini-
stration's response to September 11 in terms of domestic and international law); Jonathan
Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian
Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649 (2002) (analyzing the Bush administration's approach to
the September 1 th attacks in a historical context).
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significant phenomena. First, it will improve understanding of the
realist critique, which holds that compliance with the letter of inter-
national law would erode United States and world security interests
and, therefore, justifies suspending the requirements that tradition-
ally apply. Second, the assessment should improve comprehension of
how detentions and military tribunals violate the rule of law at home
as well as globally.
A. Military Commissions and Federal Court Jurisdiction
On November 13, 2001, President Bush promulgated an Execu-
tive Order which authorized creation of military tribunals and osten-
sibly denied federal court access to individuals tried before them.2
The President and upper-echelon administration officials relied sub-
stantially on pragmatic ideas, while they asserted that many reasons
support discontinuing the strictures which typically govern criminal
responsibility's adjudication. These include federal court trials' ex-
pense, time and risks for judges and jurors, the lack of necessity to
protect terrorists' rights, the available evidence not meeting stringent
evidentiary requirements and security mandating it be kept secret,
and detentions and commissions according government necessary
control.3 To the extent the Bush administration has invoked law, the
November order and its attempted elimination of federal court juris-
diction are based on Ex parte 4Quirin, the Second World War case im-
plicating the Nazi saboteurs; powers delegated by Article II in the
Constitution; and Congress's September 2001 Authorization for Use
of Military ForceJoint Resolution.6
See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,835-36 (Nov. 16, 2001)
[hereinafter Bush Order] ("With respect to any individual subject to this order-(1) military
tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by the individual; and (2) the
individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding... [in] any
court of the United States ... ."); see also DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 1
(2002) [hereinafter DOD ORDER] (listing crimes that may be tried by military commissions and
establishing military commission jurisdiction over these crimes), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mcol.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 1, at 977 ("[T]hey permit the use of classified evidence, pre-
sented ex parte and in camera, to convict suspects .... ."); Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1437; Ruth
Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (2002); see also
infra notes 7-22 and accompanying text. But see Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military
Commissions, 96 AM.J. INT'L L. 337 (2002).
4 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding military tribunals constitutional); see Bush Or-
der, supra note 2 (citing Quirin); DOD ORDER, supra note 2 (citing Quirin).
5 U.S. CONST. art. II.
6 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). See gen-
erally LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW
(2003) (providing a comprehensive analysis of Quirin and thejoint resolution).
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President Bush, cabinet members, and numerous other high-
ranking public officials have variously depended on Quirin, as well as
practical concepts involving national security. For example, when the
President substantiated the Executive Order, he mentioned Quirin in
recounting how President Franklin D. Roosevelt ("FDR") had insti-
tuted a World War II commission, and President Bush described
" [n] on-US citizens who plan and/or commit mass murder" as "unlaw-
ful combatants," asserting military commissions should try them if
this promoted the "national-security interest."7  On November 14,
2001, Vice President Dick Cheney similarly alluded to Quiin and the
use of military tribunals since the founding as the entities' principal
justifications and stated they could try those responsible for the ter-
rorist attacks, who do not "deserve the same guarantees" as American
citizens "going through the normal judicial process."
8
That day, Attorney General John D. Ashcroft offered analogous
notions by invoking the commissions' long tradition and High Court
recognition, most pertinently in Quirin, that these tribunals are le-
gitimate. He also argued that "foreign terrorists who commit war
crimes against the United States... are not entitled to" our constitu-
tional protections.9 On December 6, Ashcroft testified that Quirin
approved commission use "in the United States against enemy bellig-
erents," and the Court exercised "habeas corpus jurisdiction to de-
cide" on its validity and "whether the belligerents were actually eligi-
ble for trial under the commission."'1 The Department of Justice
("DOJ") Assistant Attorneys General, who led the war on terrorism,
have relied upon Quiin. For instance, the Assistant Attorney General
for the Criminal Division, Michael Chertoff, defended the Bush
7 Wayne Washington, FDR Move Cited in Tribunals, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2001, at Al; see
Mike Allen, Bush Defends Order for Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001, at A14 (afford-
ing the allusion). President Bush later supported tribunals by asking Americans to remember
that those who would be tried "are killers. They don't share the same values we share." Presi-
dent's Exchange with Reporters in Alexandria, Virginia: Military Tribunals, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOc. 469 (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v38no12.html;
seeJonathan Turley, Military Tribunal Rules Put Our Values to Test, BALT. SUN, Mar. 25, 2002, at
7A.
8 Vice President Richard Cheney, Address to the United States Chamber of Commerce
(Nov. 14, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/
11/20011114-6.html); see also 60 Minutes I (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 14, 2001) (tran-
script available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp2001
1114.html). See generally Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military
Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433 (2002) (examining the legality and wis-
dom of the Bush administration's use of military tribunals to combat terrorism).
9 Attorney General John Ashcroft & INS Commissioner Ziglar Announce INS Restructuring
Plan (Nov. 14, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarksll_14.htm.
10 Anti-Terrorism Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001)
(statement of John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, recounting the commissions' venerable
history), 2001 WL 1559002.
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Order by claiming that its language was "virtually identical" to that in
the Roosevelt proclamation and order, tribunals enjoy a long history,
and the Court found them constitutional in Quirin.1 The Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Policy, Viet Dinh, has relied
on commissions' pedigree, mentioned how FDR had convened the
bodies, and invoked Q uiin to argue the "Court has unanimously up-
held" their legitimacy. Department of Defense ("DOD") Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld supported the Bush and DOD Orders by remarking
that tribunals have been used in wartime since the nation's origins,
Roosevelt had adopted them, and the "Supreme Court upheld" the
entities' validity in Quifin.13 The DOD General Counsel, William J.
Haynes, II, depended on Quifin tojustify the March 2002 Department
Order, and he observed that the federal judiciary had affirmed ex-
ecutive power to employ tribunals.'
4
White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales has relied on Quifin for
the notion that the Justices have "consistently upheld" military com-
mission use, and he stated that the Bush Order's terms were derived
from those of the Roosevelt proclamation and order, words the Court
interpreted to allow habeas corpus scrutiny.15  The White House
Counsel also urged that any "habeas corpus proceeding in a federal
court" which challenges actions under the Bush Order authorizing
trial of non-United States citizens by military tribunals would be lim-
ited to scrutinizing "the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction.' 6
n See Department ofJustice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism,
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 8-20 (2001) [hereinafter DOJ Over-
sight] (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant U.S. Attorney General); see also infra notes 15-16
and accompanying text.
12 Viet D. Dinh, Foreword: Freedom and Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
399, 405-06 (2002). See Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, On Terror, Spying and Guns, Ashcroft Ex-
pands Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003, at Al. Dinh and Chertoff have since recanted. See Rich-
ard B. Schmitt, Patriot Act Author Has Concerns, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, at Al (discussing re-
consideration of the issues by Dinh and Chertoff ).
13 Defense Department and Military Tribunals: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services,
107th Cong. (2001) (joint statement of Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, and Paul
Wolfowitz, Deputy U.S. Secretary of Defense, discussing the appropriateness of military tribu-
nals), 2001 WL 1587683.
14 "The Fourth Circuit recently reaffirmed" these propositions in Hamdi. Letter from Wil-
liam Haynes, II, General Counsel, DOD, to Neal Sonnett, Chair, ABA Task Force on Enemy
Combatants (Sept. 23, 2002) (on file with author). See generally Jonathan Turley, The Military
Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's role in developing
the military system of governance).
15 Alberto R. Gonzales, Op-Ed, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27
(supporting the use of military commissions and defending their constitutionality); see also
Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373,394 n.85
(2002) (discussing Gonzales' claim that judicial review is preserved under the Bush Order).
16 Gonzales, supra note 15, at A27. Senators' views similar to the administration's are in the
hearings cited supra notes 10-11, 13.
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B. Detentions
The federal government has indefinitely detained thousands of
people it suspects are engaged in terrorism, and many officials have
justified the effort with practical contentions-mostly national and
global security concerns-and with legal arguments that resemble the
ones detailed for military tribunals. Since the September 2001 terror-
ist attacks, the officers have followed Ashcroft's directive that they use
"every available law enforcement tool" to incapacitate those "who par-
ticipate in, or lend support to, terrorist activities" by arresting and
holding persons in custody over long periods through criminal
charges, material witness warrants for individuals in America legally,
and immigration charges for people in the United States illegally. 17 A
specific policy of racial profiling mainly targeted at the Arab and
Muslim communities in America, as well as a veil of secrecy which
frustrates efficacious outside scrutiny, characterizes these deten-
tions.1
8
The United States has indefinitely detained a few of its citizens by
labeling them enemy combatants. For example, during 2001, Presi-
dent Bush so certified Yaser Hamdi, who remained in naval brigs
without counsel until last December, while in June 2002, Deputy At-
torney General Larry Thompson asserted Jose Padilla was imprisoned
"under the laws of war as an enemy combatant" and cited Quirin as
"clear Supreme Court" authority.19
17 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DOJ, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE
TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATrACKS (2003) [hereinafter OIG REPORT], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf. For full analysis of detentions the govern-
ment premised on alleged immigration law violations and material witness warrants, see Cole,
supra note 1.
18 SeeJonathan K. Stubbs, The Bottom Rung of America's Race Ladder: After The September 11 Ca-
tastrophe Are American Muslims Becoming America's New N.... s?, 19J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming
2004). Most courts have maintained this veil. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the government wasjustified in withholding
information regarding detainees under an exception in the Freedom of Information Act), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004) (mem.); N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d
Cir. 2002) (holding that newspapers did not have a First Amendment right of access to deporta-
tion proceedings that affected national security), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003) (mem.).
But see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that there is a First
Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings).
19 News Transcript, Deputy Secretary [of Defense] Wolfowitz at Justice Department Press
Conference (June 10, 2002) (statement by Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General),
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/t06102002_tO6lOdsd.html; see also Manooher
Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of War": The Law and Politics of La-
bes, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59 (2003); infra note 23 (showing Hamdi's three Fourth Circuit ap-
peals and one Supreme Court appeal).
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The United States has also held approximately 650 non-citizens at
Guantd.namo Bay. ° Observers have reported terrible conditions un-
der which many have labored, the use of abusive tactics to extract
confessions or other material from some, and numerous attempted
suicides.2 Virtually all detainees have received no process, although
the government stated last July that it would try a few in military
commissions and recently granted others access to counsel.
C. War on Terrorism Litigation
The DOJ and the DOD depended substantially on the pragmatic
arguments related to national security and on Quirin, in part, for
broad deference to the executive during national crises when the
agencies litigated major terrorism cases which implicated detention,
and numerous judges have agreed with these views. Moreover, Quirin
figured prominently in all of the Fourth Circuit Hamdi v. Rumsfeld• • 23 ..
decisions and in the Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush district court rul-
ing.2 The DOJ lodged its strongest contention when pursuing a
Hamdi appeal, stating that because judges have a "constitutionally
limited role ... in reviewing military decisions, courts may not sec-
ond-guess the military's determination that an individual is an enemy
combatant and should be detained as such."25 The appellate panel
denigrated the argument by first recasting it26 and then rejecting the
20 See Carlotta Gall & Neil A. Lewis, Captives: Tales of Despair from Guanttinamo, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 2003, at Al (approximating 680 men); OIG Report, supra note 17; infra notes 38-39
and accompanying text (assessing the three major challenges to the detentions); sources cited
infra note 43.
2 See Nicholas M. Horrock & Anwar Iqbal, Waiting for Gitmo, MOTHERJONES, Jan./Feb. 2004,
at 15; Raj Persaud, Mental Anguish Likely to Be Most Damaging, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 12,
2004, at 18, available at 2004 WL 70808198; David Rose, Even Death Row Is Preferable to This,
OBSERVER (London), Feb. 22, 2004, at 17.
2 See Richard Cohen, Lawless in Guanidnamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2004, at A19; Jerry
Markon, Terror Suspect, Attorneys Meet for 1st Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2004, at B3.
23 This case was first brought in the Eastern District of Virginia and has received three
Fourth Circuit opinions. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Quirin several
times), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (mem.); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2002) (citing Quirin to support judicial deference to the executive branch); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002).
24 This case was brought in the Southern District of New York. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v.
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Quirin in discussion of prisoners of war and
detention). The Second Circuit recently held that the government lacked power to detain
Padilla and ordered his release. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 715 (2d
Cir. 2003) (rejecting Quirin as establishing "President's authority to exercise military jurisdic-
tion over American citizens"), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (mem.).
25 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283.
26 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283 ("The government thus submits that we may not review at all its
designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant-that its determinations on this
score are the first and final word.").
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government's motion.2 7  Despite this rebuke, the Fourth Circuit es-
sentially agreed with the government's claim. For instance, the panel
cited Quirin extensively for ideas, such as during "World War II, the
Court stated in no uncertain terms that the President's wartime de-
tention decisions are to be accorded great deference from the
courts. 2 18 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit effectively adopted the DOJ's
perspective because the court grounded its executive acquiescence
on Quirin, did not closely analyze the support for detaining Hamdi,
and refused him access to counsel.2 9 The three Hamdi decisions also
underemphasized the substantial growth in habeas corpus and inter-
national law since Quirin issued.
District court treatment of the Padilla matter resembled, and drew
on, that in Hamdi.3' For example, the trial judge determined that the
"logic of Quirin bears strongly on this case" and broadly invoked the
opinion, which recognized the "distinction between... lawful and
unlawful combatants" and declared that "[u]nlawful combatants are
likewise subject to capture and detention."32  The court analogized
from the World War II precedent and held that President Bush had
authority to detain unlawful combatants. 39 The judge also observed
that the Justices did intimate FDR's "decision to try the saboteurs be-
fore a military tribunal rested at least in part on an exercise of Presi-
dential authority under Article II" even while acknowledging the
Court found it unnecessary to resolve whether the "President as Com-
mander in Chief ha[d] constitutional power to create milita ry
commissions without the support of congressional legislation.
Moreover, the judge displayed great deference when he espoused a
27 The court elaborated: "In dismissing, we ourselves would be summarily embracing a
sweeping proposition-namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen
alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on
the government's say-so." Id.
28 Id. at 282. See generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (finding that the President has
authority to order trial by a military commission).
29 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that Hamdi's detention was
constitutional). Hamdi remains in custody but recently was accorded access to counsel. See
Vanessa Blum, As Pressure Mounts, US. Strategy Shifts: Administration Move to Allow Counsel for De-
tainees Comes As Supreme Court Prepares to Take up Issue, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at 1.
30 See infra Part II.A.2.b. But see Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468-69 (rejecting application of the Ge-
neva Convention).
31 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also supra notes
25-30 and accompanying text.
32 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-31) (emphasis added);
see also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
33 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-96. If the Supreme Court "regarded detention alone as
a lesser consequence than.., trial by military tribunal[,] and it approved even that greater con-
sequence, then our case is a foitiori from Quirin as regards the lawfulness of detention." Id. at
595.
34 Id.; see Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28-29 (recognizing the powers of the President as Commander
in Chief).
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quite lenient proof burden of "some evidence," which the United
States must meet to justify a presidential determination that an indi-
vidual is an unlawful combatant35 The court also relied on Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer for the notion that the chief executive
was "operating at maximum authority" in the "decision to detain
Padilla as an unlawful combatant."36 However, the Second Circuit or-
dered Padilla's release and depended on Youngstown's analytical
framework for the critical ideas that (1) "the President lacks inherent
constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain American
citizens on American soil outside a zone of combat;" (2) "the Non-
Detention Act serves as an explicit congressional 'denial of authority'
within the meaning of Youngstown, thus placing us in Youngstown's
third category;" and (3) "because the Joint Resolution does not au-
thorize the President to detain American citizens seized on American
soil, we remain within Youngstown's third category.
3 7
Three major cases have challenged the indefinite detentions at
Guantfinamo Bay. The D.C. Circuit essentially rejected petitioners'
habeas corpus writs because none were U.S. citizens who had estab-
lished their presence in America, relying heavily on the 1950 prece-
dent of Johnson v. Eisentrager, and the court found that Guantinamo
was not United States territory, even though the country maintains a
naval facility there.w Yet, the Ninth Circuit held that Eisentrager did
not preclude its assertion of jurisdiction over the habeas petition or
31 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605-10 (discussing the deference given to the President's
determination). The court apparently premised this deference on its limited authority and
competence to decide the question and on the President's substantial authority in this context.
36 Id. at 606-07; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the three categories of presidential authority);
MAEVA MARcus, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
(1977) (assessing "the influence [of Youngstown] on the theory and practice of presidential
power and on the doctrine of separation of powers"); infra notes 90-110 and accompanying
text. The court did reject the government claim that Padilla should not have access to counsel.
See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 564, 599-605 (directing U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-
feld to allow Padilla to consult with counsel).
37 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003) (ordering a writ of
habeas corpus and Padilla's release). "[T]he third category [of Youngstown] includes those
situations where the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of
Congress." Id. at 711. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000) ("No citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."); Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); infra notes 90-104 (de-
scribing Youngtown's analytical framework).
38 SeeAl Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 534
(2003) (mem.); see alsojohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (finding that non-resident
aliens do not have access to courts). For more analysis of these cases, see Raquel Aldana-
Pindell, The 9/11 "National Security" Cases: Three Principles Guiding Judges'Decision-Making, 81 OR.
L. REv. 985, 1010 (2002) (citing the D.C. Circuit decision in Al Odah v. United States as rejecting
the argument that Guantdnamo Bay is U.S. territory), and Cole, supra note 1, at 983-84 (dis-
cussing the Eisentrager holding).
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necessitate sovereignty rather than territorial jurisdiction, which
clearly existed, while the court determined that the lease, the "con-
tinuing Treaty as well as the practical reality of the U.S.'s exercise of
unrestricted dominion and control over the Base[,] compel the con-
clusion that, for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction, GuantAnamo is
sovereign U.S. territory."39 Finally, the government's prosecution of
Zacarias Moussaoui in federal court has realized little success, not-
withstanding the trial judge's concerted efforts to decide the matter
fairly and promptly.
40
II. CRITICAL AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES
A. Why Reliance Is Misplaced as a Matter of Law
1. Military Commissions and Federal Court Jurisdiction
It could appear preferable to discuss briefly the administration's
misplaced reliance on Quirin when issuing the Bush and DOD Or-
ders.4' The government has prosecuted no one in military tribunals,
and scholars have explored their legitimacy.42 However, other ideas
require more assessment. Commissions will soon try defendants43 and
provoke litigation contesting their validity. Thorough evaluation will
also improve appreciation of Quirin's use, Youngstown as the most
relevant precedent, and why the latter opinion and the Constitution
do not allow the President to vitiate federal court jurisdiction, even
39 Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1300 (9th Cir. 2003). An earlier Ninth Circuit opinion
resolved the first challenge on procedural grounds when it found that plaintiffs lacked the
standing to proceed. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the
coalition lacked standing to bring claim), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003) (mem.).
40 See United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4792, 2004 WL 868261, at *21 (4th Cir. Apr. 22,
2004) (affirming the district court's conclusion that Moussaoui should be granted access to ex-
culpatory witnesses, but remanding the case to the district court to "craft substitutions under
certain guidelines."); see alsoJohn Gibeaut, Prosecuting Moussaoui, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 36 (de-
scribing the prosecution of Moussaoui); Seymour M. Hersh, The Twentieth Man, NEW YORKER,
Sept. 30, 2002, at 56 (same); Philip Shenon, Judge Rules Out a Death Penalty for 9/11 Suspect, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at Al (same).
41 See supra notes 7-22 and accompanying text; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
42 See Dickinson, supra note 1; see also Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15. See generally Cole, supra
note 1; Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tri-
bunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Youngstown at Fifty: A Symposium, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 1
(2002).
43 See DOD, MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 2 (2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/d2003O430milcominstno2.pdf; Blum, supra note
29; Dan Eggen, FBI Chief Says Tribunals May Try 9/11 Suspects, WASH. POST,Jan. 15, 2004, at Al
(stating that the September 11 conspirators will be tried in military tribunals instead of criminal
courts); Adam Liptak, The Legal Context: Tribunals Move from Theory to Reality, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2003, at A12 (stating that President Bush designated six Guantdnamo prisoners to be tried be-
fore military commissions).
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though tribunals might be legitimate in some contexts-overseas
prosecutions that arise from declared wars.
a. Why Youngstown and the Constitution Are Controlling
i. Constitutional Text and History
The Constitution's text and history as well as case law demonstrate
that Congress, not the Executive, is the federal government's political
branch authorized to create federal courtjurisdiction. Article I states
"Congress shall have Power... [t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to
the supreme Court," and Article III says "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such in-"
ferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and es-
tablish.,,45 The first Congress established the lower federal courts and
prescribed their jurisdiction.46 Article I also states Congress is to "de-
fine and punish... Offences against the Law of Nations."47  More-
over, landmark cases, such as Sheldon v. Sill,4s held that the "disposal
of the judicial power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to
Congress."
4
ii. Post-September 11, 2001, Legal Developments
Despite the Constitution's text and history, President Bush issued
the November Order, which in section 7(b) provides that the military
commissions "shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses
by" anyone subject to the Order, who "shall not be privileged to seek
any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to
have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's be-
half, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii)
any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal."
50
This expansive wording imposes the proscription on all courts-
federal, state, or international-apart from the military tribunals it
creates. As to the order's critical issues, detentions and federal
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
45 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
46 SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see Cole, supra note 1, at 977; Dickinson, supra note 1, at
1419.
48 49 U.S. 441, 8 How. 453 (1850).
49 Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. at 449, 8 How. at 462; see Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 384-86
(discussing Sheldon v. Sill).
50 Bush Order, supra note 2, § 7(b).
51 I stress jurisdiction stripping and do not assess whether the Bush Order can deprive state
or international courts or tribunals of power to afford relief. The Supreme Court sharply lim-
ited state court ability to grant people in federal officers' custody relief in Tarble's Case, 80 U.S.
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court jurisdiction stripping, the administration initially requested
Congress's approval, which lawmakers denied, and then arrogated to
itself through the directive the power sought. On September 19,
2001, President Bush sent Congress proposed legislation, titled the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 ("ATA"), which addressed numerous law
enforcement, immigration, and counterterrorism matters. Sections
202 and 203 had greatest relevance for the issues that the order
would later address. Section 202 would have authorized the Attorney
General to detain indefinitely any United States non-citizen whom
that official "ha[d] reason to believe may commit, further, or facili-
tate acts" of terrorism, defined quite broadly.53  Section 203 would
have granted the District of Columbia federal courts exclusive author-
ity over federal habeas corpus review of section 202 detentions.54 Re-
55publicans and Democrats in both Houses, as well as interest groups,
strongly opposed these sections. 6 The statute Congress ultimately
passed imposed several major restrictions on the Attorney General's
detention authority.57 First, it modified the threshold standard from
"reason to believe" to "reasonable grounds to believe" that the
(13 Wall.) 397 (1871). See also McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. 598, 6 Wheat. 268 (1821) (denying
state courts power to issue writs of mandamus to federal officers); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 46, at 298 (6th ed. 2002) (assessing McClung v. Sid-
liman).
52 A version of the proposed Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 can be found at Electronic Privacy
Information Center, http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/ata201text.pdf (last visited May
7, 2004) [hereinafter ATA]; see also Editorial, American Values on Trial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002,
at B16.
53 See ATA, supra note 52, § 202; see also Terrorism Investigation and Prosecution: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (including statement of Senator Specter
quoting § 202 of the Bush administration draft legislation), 2001 WL 1132689. See generally
Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23, 34-36 (2002) (describing the
steps taken by the government following the September 11 attacks).
See ATA, supra note 52, § 203; see also Editorial, Winging It at Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 2002, at A22 ("[P]ublic confidence... demands a return to... independent court re-
view.").
55 SeeJonathan Krim, Anti-Terror Push Stirs Fears for Liberties: Rights Groups Unite To Seek Safe-
guards, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A17 (discussing a "coalition of public interest groups
from across the political spectrum [that] has formed" in opposition to the administration's anti-
terrorism legislation because of its effects on "Americans' privacy and civil rights."); Walter Pin-
cus, Caution is Urged on Terrorism Legislation: Measures Reviewed To Protect Liberties, WASH. POST,
Sept. 21, 2001, at A22 (stating that the legislation "has quickly drawn opposition from some
members of Congress, as well as a diverse collection of interest groups."); see also Editorial, No
Rush on Rights, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A34.
For a thorough exposition of this opposition, see Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 388-
91.
51 See The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]; see also Eric Lichtblau, Republicans Want Terrorism Law
Made Permanent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, at BI (outlining the sunset provisions of the USA
PATRIOT Act).
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suspect would engage in or assist terrorist acts.5s Second, the Act sig-
nificantly limited the officer's power to detain non-citizens suspected
of terrorism. 9 Third, the Act explicitly prescribed federal judicial re-
view, through habeas corpus proceedings, of "any action or decision
relating to [section 412] (including judicial review of the merits of)"
the Attorney General's certification. 0 These restrictions are in the
USA PATRIOT Act, which President Bush signed on October 26,
61
2001.
Although Congress denied the Attorney General the indefinite
detention power sought, the order prescribed eighteen days later
granted the Defense Secretary that authority. Section 3 empowers
and directs the Secretary to take into custody and "detain [] at an ap-
propriate location.., outside or within the United States" any "indi-
vidual subject to" the directive. Section 2 defines such an individual
as any person "who is not a United States citizen with respect to
whom [the President] determine[s] from time to time in writing
that... there is reason to believe that such individual" is an interna-
tional terrorist dangerous to the United States or is someone who
"has knowingly harbored one or more" such people.3 The order in
fact claims much greater power than had been requested, as the most
aggressive stance in Congress was that federal habeas corpus review of
detentions should be limited to the District of Columbia federal
58 USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2004)); seeJohn Lancaster, Hill
Puts Brakes on Expanding Police Powers, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at A6 (noting that in the "days
after Sept. 11 ... [opinion] [p]olls showed that Americans overwhelmingly favor[ed] stronger
police powers, even at the expense of personal freedom."); see also Bryant & Tobias, supra note
15, at 390.
59 USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a) ("The Attorney General shall place an alien detained under
paragraph (1) in removal proceedings, or shall charge the alien with a criminal offense, not
later than 7 days after the commencement of such detention. If the requirement of the preced-
ing sentence is not satisfied, the Attorney General shall release the alien."). Senator Patrick Leahy
(D-Vt.) emphasized: "if an alien is found not to be removable, he must be released from cus-
tody." 147 CONG. REC. S10,558 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
60 USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a); see also 147 CONG. REC. S10,558 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (observing that "the Attorney General's certification of an alien un-
der [section 412] is subject tojudicial review").
61 The USA PATRIOT Act also changed the administration's venue proposal. See supra note
54. Original habeas corpus petitions can be filed in any U.S. district court with jurisdiction,
thus satisfying administration concerns about inconsistent authority with the less onerous stric-
ture that all appeals be heard by the D.C. Circuit and with Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit cases
as the "rule of decision." USA PATRIOT Act § 412 (a); see also Koh, supra note 53, at 34 (charac-
terizing procedural safeguards in the USA PATRIOT Act as "minimal").
62 Bush Order, supra note 2, § 3.
63 Id. § 2. The Order only covers those whom the President deems "it is in the interest of the
United States.. . be subject to this order." Id. Although this grants discretion to not apply the
order, such discretion is unbridled, so executive power to apply it against anyone deemed an
international terrorist or one who aids or abets such conduct remains unrestrained.
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courts.64 Yet, the Bush Order eliminates all judicial scrutiny that
might be sought by or on behalf of "any individual subject to [the]
order, the plain meaning of which the DOD Order later confirmed
by strictly proscribing federal judicial review of any feature of a pro-
ceeding under the order. 6 The DOD Order dispels doubt about ju-
dicial scrutiny's preclusion-even a federal court exercise of habeas
corpus jurisdiction-when it expressly states:
A Commission finding as to a charge and any sentence of a Commis-
sion becomes final when the President or, if designated by the President,
the Secretary of Defense makes a final decision thereon .... Any sen-
tence made final by action of the President or the Secretary of Defense
shall be carried out promptly.
6 v
The Bush and DOD Orders, thus, suggest that the administration in-
tends to retain suspected terrorists much longer than the USA
68
PATRIOT Act authorizes.
See supra text accompanying note 54; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249, 252-54 (2002) (assessing the
constitutional and statutory authority for the Order); Molly McDonough, Tribunals vs. Trials,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 2002, at 20 (outlining criticism of the Order "that tribunals can be held in se-
cret[,] ... do not require a unanimous verdict[,] are not held before juries[, and] may limit
defendants' opportunities to challenge evidence brought against them"); supra note 61 (show-
ing that Congress rejected the idea and treated fears about conflicting authority of administra-
tion with a less onerous habeas corpus venue provision).
63 Bush Order, supra note 2, § 7(b).
DOD ORDER, supra note 2, § 6(H); see alsoJohn Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals;
New Rules Also Allow Leeway on Evidence, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al (concluding that
"[t] he Bush [A] dministration has settled on a complex set of military tribunal regulations more
advantageous to al Qaeda and Taliban defendants than the guidelines President Bush originally
issued"); Deborah L. Rhode, Editorial, Terrorists and Their Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at
A27 (discussing the DOJ's "unilateral assertion of... authority to monitor lawyer-client com-
munications" in certain terrorist-related cases). For analysis of the Order's specific provisos, see
DOD ORDER, supra note 2, § 6(H) (4), Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 393 (describing con-
firmation of the plain meaning of section 7(b) of the Bush Order by the DOD Order), and
Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Readies Plans for Terror Tribunals, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al (dis-
cussing the relaxed safeguards in military tribunals).
67 DOD ORDER, supra note 2, § 6(H) (2); see also Mintz, supra note 66 (stating that the origi-
nal order barred appeals after conviction); Serrano, supra note 66 (noting that the order in-
cluded no appeals to federal courts or the U.S. Supreme Court).
Given the Orders' prohibitions on federal court review, I find deficient White House
Counsel's claim that the Bush Order preserves civilian court review: "anyone arrested, detained
or tried in the United States by a military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of
the commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court." Gonza-
les, supra note 15, at A27. This otherwise promising concession does not override the many in-
dications that certification under Bush's Order precludes federal court review of detention, im-
prisonment, or other punishment, including death, that it authorizes. First, Gonzales limited
his promise of review in civilian courts to those "arrested, detained[,] or tried in the United
States" and to challenges to "lawfulness of a commission's jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis added).
Depending on the administration's view of 'Jurisdiction," it may argue a federal habeas court
can only confirm the President had found in writing a detainee "subject to" his Order. Bush
Order, supra note 2, § 2. Second, Gonzales justified his informal view by citation to Quirin, not
the Order's text, which seems to proscribe judicial review. Gonzales, supra note 15, at A27. But
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Congress, and in particular senators, quickly and forcefully re-
sponded to the Bush Order. The Senate Judiciary Committee held
several hearings in which many government officials and constitu-
tional scholars with diverse political viewpoints testified.69 Certain
members of the administration contended that President Bush's au-
thority as "Commander in Chief"70 of the armed forces included the
power to issue the order," but no witness analyzed whether the Presi-
dent could unilaterally abrogate federal court jurisdiction. Yet others
voiced serious concerns about the order's legitimacy, because it in-
vaded Congress's province 72 or violated Bill of Rights guarantees.
73
The hearings and later actions, mainly the administration's lack of so-
licitude for legislative requests "to review and be consulted about the
draft [DOD] regulations[,]" 7 led Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the
Judiciary Committee Chair, to act.75 He sponsored a February 2002
bill that "would provide the executive branch with the specific au-
thorization it now lacks to use extraordinary tribunals to try members
of the al Qaeda terrorist network and those who cooperated with
them, 76 because the President does not have power to create the en-
tities unilaterally. 77 This proposal would restrict detainment and mili-
tary trials much more and accord greater procedural protections
than did the Bush Order. For example, the bill exempts "individuals
arrested while present in the United States, since our civilian court
the Quirin Court reached the merits only after the DOJ elected "not to contest the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction." Lloyd Cutler, Column, Rule of Law: Lessons On Tribunals-From 1942,
WALL ST.J., Dec. 31, 2001, at A9. The administration might do so, relying on the Orders' terms
and, thus, have the courts reach the constitutional issues avoided in 1942. Even if Gonzales had
clearly found that the Bush Order protected judicial review through habeas corpus, this view
does not bind the administration in later litigation. I assume Counsel's integrity and good faith,
but his article does not commit President Bush to the close federal court review to which he
should acquiesce.
69 See 147 CONG. REC. S13,275-77 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (re-
viewing the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings related to the Bush Order).
70 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
71 See, e.g., DOJ Oversight, supra note 11, at 314 (statement of John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney
General) ("[T]he President's authority to establish war crimes commissions arises out of his
power as commander-in-chief.").
72 See 147 CONG. REC. S13,277 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (summa-
rizing testimony of a number of legal experts who found that the Bush Order invaded the pow-
ers of Congress).
73 See, e.g., DOJ Oversight, supra note 11, at 93-94 (statement of Neal Katyal, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University) (stating how the Bush Order would violate protections in the Bill of
Rights).
74 148 CONG. REc. S742 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
75 See id. at S741.
76 Id.
7 Id. ("The Attorney General testified at our hearing on December 6 that the President
does not need the sanction of Congress to convene military commission [s], but I disagree. Mili-
tary tribunals may be appropriate under certain circumstances, but only if they are backed by specific
congressional authorization.") (emphasis added).
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system is well-equipped to handle such cases "" and subjects deten-
tions to the supervision of the D.C. Circuit.79
President Bush, thus, relied on his power as President and Armed
Forces Commander in Chief to issue the order requiring that military
tribunals try certain persons who violate the laws of war and other
applicable laws and depriving these individuals of federal court access
and the judiciary ofjurisdiction. However, Senate and House Repub-
licans and Democrats questioned the directive's constitutionality,
conducted hearings and introduced proposed legislation, which
would curtail the authority President Bush claimed and expressly pre-
serve federal court review. These indicia of disapproval, together
with legislative denial of administration requests for the broad power
the order claims, suggest that its effort to abolish jurisdiction contra-
venes legislative will.
iii. Youngstown
In reviewing this attempted elimination of judicial jurisdiction,
one must remember that the constitutional text, history, and High
Court opinions show that Congress has practically total authority to
establish the federal courts and provide their jurisdiction. President
Harry Truman's 1952 assertion of power to seize steel mills and the
Youngstown decision that he lacked the authority are the controlling
precedents. The Court assessed presidential issuance of an Executive
Order that seized the steel mills because he thought an impending
strike by the steelworkers' union would disrupt the Korean War ef-
fort.8° Truman based the Order on powers the Constitution and stat-
utes vested in him as President and Armed Forces Commander in
Chief. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, held that Truman
did not have seizure authority."' However, four Justices-Felix Frank-
furter, RobertJackson, William 0. Douglas, and Harold Burton-who
78 Id. at S742; see also Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2002, S. 1941, 107th Cong. § 3.
On March 20, 2002, House members introduced an identical bill. See H.R. 4035, 107th Cong.
(2002). A year later, House members sponsored new bills. See Detention of Enemy Combatants
Act, H.R. 1029, 108th Cong. (2003); Military Tribunals Act of 2003, H.R. 1290, 108th Cong.
79 SeeS. 1941, § 5(d); supra note 73 and accompanying text; infra notes 81, 84 and accompa-
nying text. See generally CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT
(1999);JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OFJUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE
COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT (2001).
80 See Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952). See generally MARCUS, supra
note 36 (discussing the impact of the Youngstown decision on the exercise of presidential power
and the doctrine of separation of powers).
81 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 189-92 (2001) (discussing factors that played a role in the
Supreme Court's decision).
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joined BlackS2 -authored separate opinions.s  Black stated that
power, if any existed, for adopting the order must be in a federal law
or the Constitution." He found neither statutes explicitly authorizing
the President to seize private property nor Acts from which this pre-
rogative could fairly be implied."5 Black surveyed whether the Consti-
tution granted inherent power to issue the Order and canvassed po-
tential sources from which the authority might derive. 6 He initially
proclaimed that characterizing seizure as an exercise of Truman's
military power as Armed Forces Commander in Chief would not suf-
fice and described the initiative as a "job for the Nation's lawmakers,
not for its military authorities."8  Black then ascertained that the sev-
eral constitutional provisos which endow the President with executive
power furnished little support, principally because the document's
structure and language assign Congress lawmaking authority, which is
not subject to "presidential or military supervision or control."
' s
The Justices who joined Black might have concurred for reasons
similar to those Frankfurter espoused. The only concurrence which
deserves textual analysis is Justice Jackson's opinion, as its tripartite
scheme for resolving separation of powers issues is now an icon.90
Jackson opened his framework for evaluating federal governmental
authority by describing it as a rather oversimplified classification of
practical situations in which the President could doubt, or others
might challenge, the official's authority and crudely distinguish the
82 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 634 (Jackson, J., con-
curring); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring).
J3 justice Tom Clark concurred in the judgment but not in the opinion. See id. at 660
(Clark, J., concurring in part).
84 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585.
s5 See Youngstown. 343 U.S. at 585. No law in express terms allowed the chief executive to use
seizure as a tool for addressing labor disputes, while Congress had clearly rejected this ap-
proach. Id. at 585-86.
86 The government did not argue that the grant was express. See id. at 587.
87 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. He found theater of war an expanding concept, but could
not hold the President's Executive Order constitutional. Id.
88 Id. at 588; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8, cl. 18; art. II, § 3.
89 Black's separation of powers analysis led Frankfurter to join the majority opinion, but he
found the principle more complex and flexible than it seemed and stated that varying views
might have suggested different emphasis and nuance which one decision could not capture,
thus requiring individual articulation to reach a common result. See Youngstown 343 U.S. at 593
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial
Opinion in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAw 187, 202-04 (Peter Brooks &
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (claiming the concurrence as the most persuasive opinion in the
Court's history); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 42, at 1274 (characterizing Jackson's analytical con-
struct as "three now-canonical categories that guide modern analysis of separation of powers").
See generally Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 406-18 (analyzing the concurrences). The lower
courts that resolved Padilla also relied heavily on Youngstown. See supra notes 36-37 and accom-
panying text.
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legal effects created by this relativity factor." The three categories
designate contexts in which executive power is largest, least substan-
tial, and somewhere between those polar extremes. The jurist main-
tained that the President exercises the most authority when proceed-
ing with Congress's express or implied approval because the power
includes all that the officer has and all that the lawmakers delegate.92
He described the second category as an intermediate one where the
Chief Executive proceeds absent an explicit legislative grant or denial
and can rely on the President's own authority alone, although there is
a "zone of twilight" where the Chief Executive and Congress might
have concurrent power or authority's distribution remains unclear.93
In these situations, thus, legislative "inertia, indifference or quies-
cence," as practical matters, could occasionally allow, and perhaps
encourage, independent presidential efforts, while actual tests of
power may reflect the "imperatives of events and contemporary im-
ponderables, [not] abstract theories of law. 9 4 The third grouping in-
cludes executive initiatives that conflict with express or implied legis-
lative will. Presidential authority is at its nadir, because the Chief
Executive can invoke only the official's explicit powers in the Consti-
tution minus any applicable congressional authority.95 Jackson
admonished that here judges must closely assess executive assertions
and honor exclusive power solely if courts disable legislators from act-
ing on particular matters.96 When Jackson applied his three-pronged
framework to the seizure, he quickly excluded the first category, as
the government "conceded that no congressional authorization exists
for this seizure,"97 and the second, because lawmakers had not found
seizure an open issue.98 Thus, the initiative must be sustained under
the third classification's severe restraints, and the Justices could af-
firm the endeavor only by finding that seizure was within executive
power and beyond Congress's purview.99 Jackson pledged to read
flexibly the President's enumerated constitutional authority, and he
91 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
92 See id. at 635-37. The president personifies the federal sovereignty, so invalidation of an
action undertaken would mean that the "Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks
power." Id at 636-37.
93 Id. at 637 (citation omitted).
94 Id. (citation omitted).
95 See id.
96 Id. at 637-38. A claim so conclusive and preclusive requires scrutiny, as the constitutional
system's equilibrium is at stake. Id. at 638; see also Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (scrutinizing "war power").
97 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638. This would also remove the support of many declarations
and precedents that were proffered in "relation, and must be confined, to this category." Id.
(citation omitted).
98 See id. at 639.
9 See id. at 640.
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surveyed the power claimed by reviewing the Executive Article's three
clauses.100 However, the jurist concluded that the steel seizure effort
originated in the President's will and was an "exercise of authority
without law."1'
Application of Youngstown's evaluative framework to the Bush Or-
der suggests that the Order's authorization for indefinite detention
and elimination of federal court review are unconstitutional. 10 2 The
provisions fail the Youngstown test mainly because they violate recent
expressions of legislative will regarding both matters.' The Constitu-
tion's text and history also show that Congress, not the Executive, is
the political branch with the power to prescribe federal court juris-
diction. 4 Accordingly, the Bush Order's indefinite detention and ju-
risdiction-stripping features invade even more than the steel seizure
action legislative prerogatives.
b. A Word About Quirin
The foregoing analysis finds that Youngstown would govern consti-
tutional challenges to major provisos of the Bush Order. That as-
sessment implies that Quirin is not controlling and, indeed, has lim-
ited relevance, even though the administration depended
substantially on the case. This reliance is misplaced for reasons in
addition to the determination of unconstitutionality that Articles I
and III and Youngstown compel. The administration justifies military
tribunals in part because they are premised on the Roosevelt ana-
logue, whose legitimacy the Quiin Court validated.
These arguments, however, lack force. Earlier commissions,
which afforded such drastically cabined procedural safeguards as the
Bush Order, were used only when Congress had expressly approved
them or declared war.0 5  Lawmakers have instituted neither action,
100 Id. He rejected a "niggardly construction" as some clauses could become nearly unwork-
able and immutable by indulging no "latitude of interpretation for changing times." Id.
101 Id. at 655. For Youngstown's later invocation, especially in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981), see Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 420-23.
102 The Black opinion's laconic nature and the numerous and diverse concurrences frustrate
precise characterization of the holding. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 4-7, at 671-73 (3d ed. 2000); see also Bryant & Tobias, supra note 15, at 425-26 (articulat-
ing Youngstown's analytical framework).
103 See supra Part II.A.1.a.ii. Indeed, the congressional developments since September 11,
2001, are even more powerful than those in Youngstown because they are clearer and quite re-
cent. For additional application of the analytical framework in Youngstown, see Bryant & Tobias,
supra note 15, at 425-31.
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
05 See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1420; see also Koh, supra note 3, at 340 ("In Quinn, Congress
had formally declared war, which it has not done here, and had specifically authorized the use
of military commissions in its Articles of War." (citation omitted)).
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thus restricting Quirin's application. Moreover, the Roosevelt proc-
lamation was narrowly confined to "sabotage, espionage[,] or other
hostile or warlike acts."' °7 In striking contrast, the Bush Order
broadly prescribes the offenses for which tribunals may try defen-
dants to encompass violations of the "laws of war and other applicable
laws,"'08 thereby extending the entities' scope beyond what Quiin ap-
proved.'9 In 1996, Congress also passed the War Crimes Act, which
contemplates that persons who commit statutorily-defined war crimes
will receive civilian trials."0
2. Detentions
a. Quirin
The Executive has asserted that Quirinjustifies indefinite deten-
tions as well as broad judicial deference to administration decision-
making regarding the detentions and military tribunals, while federal
judges have upheld detentions and acquiesced. However, the Quiin
opinion cannot support these notions. Many phenomena, including
the extraordinary wartime context, should limit the case's reach.
Furthermore, Quiin's author, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, in-
tentionally wrote a restricted opinion, which some observers claim
must be read narrowly.
i. The Quiin Facts
Quirin's facts warrant much analysis, as they are so peculiar and
deserve a confined reading."' After the United States declared war,
106 In 1941, Congress had declared war and had approved tribunals in its Articles of War. See
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30 (1942); see also 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994). But see Goldsmith & Bradley, supra
note 64, at 250 ("Although the [Bush Order] was not preceded by a congressional declaration
of war, such a declaration is not constitutionally required in order for the President to exercise
his constitutional or statutory war powers, including his power to establish military commis-
sions.").
107 See Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942); see also Quirin, 317 U.S. 22-23
(quoting same regulation).
108 Bush Order, supra note 2, § 1 (e).
109 Congress has not declared war or authorized the use of tribunals for violations exceeding
the laws of war. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1421; see also infra notes 184-91 and accompany-
ing text (suggesting Quirin may also be limited because federal habeas corpus, international,
and human rights laws were underdeveloped in 1942).
110 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996); see Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1420-21. I combine below analysis
of misplaced reliance on Quirin both for detentions and in litigation over terrorism issues. In
the major terrorism cases reviewed above, the DOJ relied heavily on Quirin; however, the cases
attacking detentions and the judges deciding them also cited Quirin. Some ideas in this para-
graph show why Quirin cannot support broad notions, namely indefinite detention.
I For the facts of the case, see Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20-22. See generally FISHER, supra note 6;
EUGENE RACHLIS, THEY CAME To KILL: THE STORY OF EIGHT NAZI SABOTEURS IN AMERICA
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Adolf Hitler mandated prompt action against America on its soil.1 12
Germany developed a plan with military and propaganda constituents
by requiring the destruction of American bridges, factories, railroad
stations, and department stores.113 In spring 1942, experts instructed
the saboteurs on detonators, explosives, and related measures at a
training camp near Berlin.'1 4 Two teams of four saboteurs each then
boarded a submarine that deposited one group, with explosives, at a
Long Island beach under cover of darkness on June 13, 1942 and the
other team in northern Florida on June 17.5 Both teams' members
landed, dressed wholly or partly in German Marine Infantry uni-
forms, but then journeyed to major cities in civilian clothes.16 Two
saboteurs concluded that they would be caught yet might be saved by
betraying the others, so one of them fully confessed to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI").17 On June 27, all the saboteurs were
in custody, and the FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, announced their
capture."'
On June 30, Roosevelt informed the Attorney General, Francis
Biddle, that the saboteurs "are just as guilty as it is possible to be,"
and "offenses such as these are probably more serious than any of-
fense in criminal law"; thus, the "death penalty is called for by usage
and by the extreme gravity of the war aim and the [nation's] very ex-
istence"; and they should "be tried by court martial."" 9 Biddle, after
consulting the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and the Army Judge
(1961); Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the
Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REv. 59, 62-63 (1980); David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1J.
Sup. Cr. HIST. 61 (1996).
12 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; see also Danelski, supra note 111, at 61. Seegenerally FISHER, supra
note 6, at 4; Cyrus Bernstein, The Saboteur Trial: A Case History, 11 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 131-32
(1943) (discussing the orders given to the saboteurs).
113 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Robert E. Cushman, Ex parte Quirin et al.- The Nazi Saboteur Case,
28 CORNELL L.Q 54, 55 (1942); Danelski, supra note 111, at 61, 63.
114 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Danelski, supra note 111, at 63. See generally FISHER, supra note 6,
at 1-23 (detailing the saboteurs' arrival and activities in America).
15 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Cushman, supra note 113, at 54; Danelski, supra note 111, at 63-
64.
116 Seesources cited supra note 115. See generally FISHER, supra note 6, at 26-28, 35.
117 See Belknap, supra note 111, at 62; Bernstein, supra note 112, at 136-37; Danelski, supra
note 111, at 64-65.
)18 See sources cited supra note 107; see also Belknap, supra note 111, at 62-63 (stating that
Americans reacted as if there had been a major victory in the war when Hoover announced
their capture); Danelski, supra note 111, at 64-65 (explaining that the FBI's issuance of mislead-
ing press releases, which suggested that its diligence led to the arrests, began the "government
control on information about the Saboteurs' [clase and the government's successful use of the
case for propaganda purposes.").
119 Danelski, supra note 111, at 65 (quoting Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Fran-
cis Biddle, Attorney General (June 30, 1942), 1940-44 PSF FDR Papers, FDR Library). See gen-
erallyJonathan Turley, Quirin Revisited, NAT'L. L.J., Oct. 28, 2002, at A17 (suggesting the Quirin
case raised questions about the Court's susceptibility to bias and threats in wartime).
[Vol. 6:5
PUNISHMENT AND TIE WAR ON TERRORISM
Advocate General, Myron Cramer, urged that a military commission
be convened to try the saboteurs. 20 Roosevelt issued a July 2 Execu-
tive Order creating a military tribunal, appointing the judges, prose-
cutors, and defense counsel, and prescribing procedures as well as
review of the trial record and any commission judgment or sen-
tence .'I The Order departed from Articles of War strictures by: au-
thorizing admission of evidence with probative value for a reasonable
person; conviction and a death penalty sentence's imposition on a
two-thirds, not a unanimous, vote; and direct transmittal of the re-
cord, judgment, and sentence to the Chief Executive for review.
1 2
The same day, the President issued a Proclamation, ostensibly closing
the federal courts to "persons who are subjects, citizens[,] or resi-
dents of any nation at war with the United States ... and are charged
with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage,
espionage ... or violations of the laws of war." 22  On July 3, Cramer
filed charges with the military commission stating that the eight sabo-
teurs had violated the laws of war; Article 81 of the Articles of War,
which involved relieving the enemy; Article 82, which implicated spy-
ing; as well as conspiracy to commit these offenses. 24 Five days later,
the tribunal commenced the secret trial in a DOJ assembly room, and
it continued for three weeks. 25 The saboteurs' counsel, Army Colo-
nels Cassius Dowell and Kenneth Royall, believed the Order and
Proclamation lacked validity and informed Roosevelt that they would
seek habeas review, prompting his enraged response: "I won't hand
them over to any United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas
120 See Danelski, supra note 111, at 66 (citing Memorandum from Francis Biddle, Attorney
General, to President Roosevelt (June 30, 1942), OF 5036, FDR MSS). Biddle thought this ap-
proach would be rather expeditious, make it easier to prove the charge of violating the law of
war, and permit the death penalty's imposition. See FISHER, supra note 6, at 48-50; Belknap,
supra note 111, at 63-64; Danelski, supra note 111, at 66. He also harbored secrecy concerns,
that there not be revelations about the ease with which the saboteurs had landed on American
soil and the inept FBI behavior at the Second World War's outset. See Belknap, supra note 111;
Danelski, supra note 111, at 66; Katyal & Tribe, supra note 42, at 1280-81.
121 Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101, 5103 (July 7, 1942); see also Danelski, supra note
111, at 67 (detailing FDR's decision to issue the order).
1 Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. at 5103; see also Danelski, supra note 111, at 67. Biddle
told Roosevelt the deviations "should save a considerable amount of time" but would also facili-
tate the saboteurs' conviction and imposition of the death penalty. Danelski, supra note 111, at
66 (quoting Memorandum from Francis Biddle, Attorney General, to President Roosevelt (June
30, 1942), OF 5036, FDR MSS).
123 Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. at 5101 (July 2, 1942); see also Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 22-23 (1942). See generally FISHER, supra note 6, at 50-53 (discussing Roosevelt's Proclama-
tion).
124 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23; see also Bernstein, supra note 112, at 142-43; Danelski, supra note
111, at 67 (listing the charges).
125 The government stated that the Commission was conducting the trial in secret for security
reasons. See Belknap, supra note 111, at 66; Espionage: 7 Generals v. 8 Saboteurs, TIME, July 20,
1942, at 15.
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corpus.""' In late July, Biddle and Royall convinced the Supreme
Court to hear the case, and Stone convened a special session.' The
Court heard oral arguments for over nine hours on July 29 and 30 .
Before the initial argument, all of the Justices except Douglas, who
was en route, met in conference for a preliminary discussion, andJus-
tice Owen Roberts stated that Biddle thought Roosevelt would exe-
cute the saboteurs regardless of their appeals' disposition.'2 9 The
Court quickly decided the case, assembling less than a day after ar-
guments to issue a terse per curiam order.' Stone recounted the
litigation's history and said that the Justices would announce their
disposition and later file a full opinion that explained the reason-
ing.13 The order found Roosevelt had constitutional power to create
a military tribunal and try the saboteurs, who had "not shown cause
for being discharged by writ of habeas corpus."
32
The commission, which had recessed while the saboteurs ap-
pealed, promptly resumed.'3  On August 1, it heard closing argu-
ments, and two days later, found all defendants guilty and recom-
mended death sentences. The tribunal submitted the record directly
to Roosevelt, who accepted most suggestions. 34  On August 8, the
United States electrocuted six of the petitioners. 5  The President
then sealed the case record for World War II's remainder.
136
Stone agonized over the draft's full opinion for more than six
weeks. 37 On September 25, he circulated it with a memorandum,
16 FRANcIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 331 (1962); Danelski, supra note 111, at 68.
12 FISHER, supra note 6, at 67-68; RACHLIS, supra note 111, at 246. The lower court proce-
dural history appears in Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19-20.
128 Belknap, supra note 111, at 75. For summaries of the arguments proffered by the United
States and by the petitioners, see id. at 70-75; Danelski, supra note 111, at 68-69. See generally
FISHER, supra note 6, at 89-108 (discussing the arguments presented by both sides in their re-
spective briefs as well as those proffered at oral argument).
129 Danelski, supra note 111, at 69.
130 Belknap, supra note 111, at 76.
131 Danelski, supra note 111, at 68-72; RACHLIS, supra note 111, at 272.
132 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19; RACHLIS, supra note 111, at 272. The Court, thus, dismissed the
petitioners' applications for habeas writs and affirmed the district court. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-
19.
9*s Danelski, supra note 111, at 71.
134 The record was 3000 pages. President Roosevelt did commute death sentences recom-
mended for the two saboteurs who defected. Belknap, supra note 111, at 77; Danelski, supra
note 111, at 72.
135 Belknap, supra note 111, at 77. Roosevelt reportedly hoped that the military commission
would propose death by hanging. WILLIAM D. HASSETT, OFF THE RECORD WITH FDR, 1942-
1945, at 97 (1958); Danelski, supra note 111, at 72.
136 See Bernstein, supra note 112, at 188-89 (detailing a White House announcement summa-
rizin7g the results of the case); Daneiski, supra note 111, at 71-72.
See Danelski, supra note 111, at 72 ("He would devote more than six weeks to the task,
which he described as a 'mortification of the flesh.'"). Chief Justice Stone posited an intuitive
rationale for a decision, but his law clerks found "little authority" for this, and Stone could only
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intimating that certain issues the defense counsel had raised in July
had not been before the Court, yet urging that they be decided
against the saboteurs.' For several weeks, Stone negotiated changes
which would satisfy a fewJustices' concerns.3 9 Stone then focused on
the Articles of War provisos over which the Court was evenly divided
and for which he had written two drafts.4 0 Justice Frankfurter unsuc-
cessfully pursued support for the second. 4 ' However, on October 16,
Justice Jackson circulated a memorandum that resembled a concur-
rence, which troubled other members, who had earlier agreed that
unanimity was critical.'42 He believed the Court exceeded its powers
"in reviewing the legality of the President's Order [and that] experi-
ence shows the judicial system is unfitted to deal with matters in
which we must present a united front to a foreign foe."1 43 That action
jeopardized unanimity and led Frankfurter to pen a "Soliloquy."'
4
This imaginary exchange criticized the dead saboteurs for appealing
and for igniting a divisive three-branch fight.4 5  Once Jackson read
cite analogous cases at numerous crucial points. Id.; see also id. (citing Letter from Chief Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone to Bennett Boskey (Aug. 9, 1942)).
138 He expressed concern about the Court being "in the unenviable position of having stood
by and allowed six men to go to their death without making it plain to all concerned-
including the President-that it had left undecided a question on which counsel strongly relied
to secure petitioners' liberty." Id. (citing Memorandum from ChiefJustice Stone to the Court
(Sept. 25, 1942), Box 68, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
1 See id. at 75-76 (discussing Stone's changes to the opinion to satisfy Justices Roberts,
Black, and Douglas).
140 Id.
141 This draft stated that the Articles of War did not bind the Chief Executive. See id. at 76
(citing Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justices Owen Roberts, Stanley Reed,
and James Byrnes (Aug. 1942)); id. (citing Paige Box 12, Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law
School; Justice Stanley Reed tojustice Felix Frankfurter (received Sept. 13, 1942), Paige Box 12,
Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School).
142 Justices Stone, Frankfurter, and Black were troubled by the memorandum. See id. (citing
Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson (Oct. 23, 1942), Box 124, Robert H. Jackson Pa-
pers, Library of Congress).
143 See id. (quoting Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson (Oct. 23, 1942), Box 124,
Robert H.Jackson Papers, Library of Congress); Belknap, supra note 111, at 79.
144 The document has attained considerable notoriety. See Felix Frankfurter, FF. 's Soliloquy
(Oct. 23, 1942), reprinted in 5 GREEN BAG 2D 438 (2002); see also G. Edward White, Felix Frank-
furter's "Soliloquy" in Ex parte Quirin, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 423 (2002) (introducing the soliloquy by
summarizing the facts leading to its writing).
145 See Frankfurter, supra note 144, at 439 ("You've done enough mischief already without
leaving the seeds of a bitter conflict involving the President, the courts and Congress after your
bodies will be rotting in lime."); see also Danelski, supra note 111, at 77 (showing that Frank-
furter implored the Justices with a patriotic plea against precipitating an abstract constitutional
debate while America was at war). Frankfurter quotes an imaginary soldier as saying:
Haven't you got any more sense than to get people by the ear on one of the favorite
American pastimes-abstract constitutional discussions.... Just relax and don't be too
engrossed in your own interest in verbalistic conflicts because the inroads on energy and
national unity that such conflict inevitably produce, is a pastime we had better postpone
until peacetime.
Frankfurter, supra note 144, at 440.
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the missive, he decided against a concurrence, 46 while Justice Roberts
urged compromise. 47 Stone continued "patient negotiations"'48 and
announced the Court's decision on October 29, 1942.149
ii. Analysis of the Quiin Opinion
The Court intentionally resolved the case on the narrowest
grounds, so stating expressly, and declined to address many factual
and legal questions. For example, Stone neither thoroughly scruti-
nized the claims against, and defenses proffered by, the saboteurs,
nor the processes which tested them. This review derived in essence
from party agreement that rigorous scrutiny exceeded the Court's
capacity, given the time restraints. Most relevant facts were actually
stipulated and undisputed, 50 while Stone did not address petitioners'
"guilt or innocence.' 5 ' The Justices also left undecided some legal
questions, such as whether Roosevelt alone might create the tribunal
or whether Congress could limit presidential authority to treat enemy
belligerents, mainly because it had "authorized trial of offenses
against the law of war before such commissions.
"
5
The Court first assessed the government contention that Roose-
velt's proclamation prevented the saboteurs from seeking federal
court review because they were "enemy aliens" who had engaged in
the behavior recounted above. Notwithstanding the document's
specific words, which purported to eliminate judicial scrutiny, the Jus-
tices reviewed the petitioners' habeas writs."' Stone admonished that
146 See Danelski, supra note 111, at 78 (citing Notes exchanged by Justices Felix Frankfurter
and RobertJackson (Oct. 1942), Paige Box 12, Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School).
147 See id. (citingJustice Owen Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (n.d.)).
148 See id. at 79 (citing ChiefJustice Harlan Fiske Stone to Roger Nelson (Nov. 30, 1942), Box
69, Stone Papers).
149 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Chief Justice Stone ultimately secured a resolution in
which his colleagues agreed to disagree about the rationale. See Danelski, supra note 111, at 78-
79 (detailing the compromises the Justices' made); see also infra notes 169-72 and accompany-
ing text (discussing compromises).
150 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20 (presenting the facts as undisputed except where noted). I re-
produce many of the facts above. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
1 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. For example, the Supreme Court did not resolve the question of
whether one of the saboteurs had actually lost his United States citizenship. See id. at 37-38
(noting that because "[c]itizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not re-
lieve him from the consequences of belligerency," determination of that issue was irrelevant).
152 Id. at 29, 47 (declining to address petitioners' contention that if Congress authorized their
trials "it ha[d] by the Articles of War prescribed the procedure by which the trial [was] to be
conducted").
153 Id. at 24-25; see also supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
154 Quinin, 317 U.S. at 25 ("[Tlhere is certainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude ac-
cess to the courts for determining its applicability to the particular case."); see In reYamashita,
327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (stating that Congress has "not withdrawn Uurisdiction], and the Execu-
tive" could not unless habeas corpus were suspended).
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federal courts could overturn petitioners' trial and detention-which
the President had ordered by exercising Commander-in-Chief au-
thority in wartime---only if clearly convinced they violated the Consti-
tution or statutes. 55 The Court canvassed Article I and II powers that
provide for the common defense and found that the President has
broad authority to wage war as declared by Congress and to effectuate
all statutes which prescribe war's conduct as well as to define and
punish "offenses against the law of nations.", 56  Stone then asked
"whether any of the acts charged [were] an offense against the law of
war cognizable before a military tribunal, and if so[,] whether the
Constitution prohibits the trial," ascertaining "[b]y universal agree-
ment and practice, the law of war" distinguishes lawful and unlawful
combatants: the former are "subject to capture and detention as
prisoners of war by opposing military forces.' 5 1 Unlawful combat-
ants, such as the enemy "who without uniform comes secretly
through [military] lines" to wage war by destroying life or property,
are "offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment
by military tribunals." 158 The Justices so classified the saboteurs, find-
ing the initial allegation's first specification adequate to "charge all
the petitioners with the offense of unlawful belligerency, [the] trial of
which" was within the commission's jurisdiction. 9  The Court said
they were not "any the less belligerents" because some were United
States citizens or had not "actually committed or attempted to com-
mit any act of depredation" or entered an area of active military op-
erations.
16
0
Stone next assessed the merits of petitioners' substantive claims
that they were entitled to "presentment or indictment of a grand
jury" by the Fifth Amendment and to a civil courtjury trial by Article
III and the Sixth Amendment. 6' "[L]ong-continued and consistent
interpretation" meant the provisos did not extend "the right to
155 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
156 Id. at 25-29; see U.S. CONST. arts. I-II. The Court's survey of the Articles of War found
that Congress had expressly accorded military tribunals "jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses
against the law of war in appropriate cases." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28; see also TRIBE, supra note
102, § 4-6, at 670 ("In time of war... this executive authority swells ... [justified by] the Presi-
dent's position as Commander in Chief.").
157 Quinin, 317 U.S. at 29-31.
158 Id. at 31 (citation omitted).
159 See id. at 36 ("The specification so plainly alleges violation of the law of war as to require
but brief discussion of petitioners' contentions.").
160 Id. at 37-38 (finding "[m]odern warfare is directed at the destruction of enemy war sup-
plies.., as much as at the armed forces."). "The offense was complete when" each person, who
was an enemy belligerent, passed or went behind American "military and naval lines and de-
fenses... [wearing] civilian dress and with hostile purpose." Id. at 38; see also TRIBE, supra note
102, § 3-5, at 300 n.185 (stating that jurisdiction extended even to American citizens for sabo-
tage).
161 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38-45.
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
demand a jury to trials by military commission, or [require] that of-
fenses against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be
tried only in the civil courts." 16 2  The Court assumed that some of
those offenses are "constitutionally triable only by a jury,,11 a view it
had articulated in Ex parte Milligan.'64 Petitioners argued that Milligan
held that the law of war "can never be applied to citizens in states
which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the
courts are open and their process unobstructed."165 Because Milligan
"was not an enemy belligerent," Stone distinguished this opinion, ap-
parently restricting Milligan to its facts and finding the decision inap-
plicable to the present case.166
The Court did not designate meticulously the tribunal jurisdic-
tion's ultimate scope as the saboteurs, "upon the conceded facts, were
plainly within those boundaries.' 167 The Justices, thus, held only that
the behavior at issue was an "offense against the law of war which the
Constitution authorize[d] to be tried by military commission." '1,8 The
Court was "unanimous in its conclusion that the Articles in question
could not at any stage of the proceedings afford any basis for issuing
the writ[,]" 69 but lacked a majority who agreed on the "appropriate
grounds for decision." 0 Certain Justices thought "Congress did not
intend the Articles of War to govern a Presidential military commis-
sion convened for [resolving] questions relating to admitted enemy
invaders,"'' even as others believed specific Articles covered this tri-
bunal, but neither precluded the measures Roosevelt prescribed nor
those used.
72
My analysis shows many factors warrant limiting Quirin. For ex-
ample, the case evinces the speed with which the government
162 Id. at 40.
163 Id. at 29.
164 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); see REHNQUIST, supra note 81, at 75-77 (stating the result
would have been identical even if Congress provided for a court martial); Katyal & Tribe, supra
note 42, at 1287 (characterizing Milligan as holding congressional authorization necessary but
not sufficient for military tribunal).
165 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121; see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (quoting Milligan).
166 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46 (deciding it was sufficient that the pleaded facts plainly estab-
lished petitioners were alleged to be enemy belligerents under stated laws). See generally
RICHARD H. FALLON JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 408-15 (5th ed. 2003); Belknap, supra note 111, at 85 (arguing Stone concluded
Milligan was not "associated with the armed forces of the enemy"); Katyal & Tribe, supra note
42, at 1277-87 (discussing the Milligan and Quirin decisions).
167 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 46.
169 Id. at 47.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See id. at 47-48 (noting that some Justices did not limit available procedures to those ap-
plicable under the Articles of War).
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proceeded, the Court's ratification of the commission deliberations
and the difficulties of rationalizing the full opinion once the United
States had used a hastily-written, laconic per curiam order to execute
six petitioners. 3 Stone described his justificatory effort as a "mortifi-
cation of the flesh,',7 4 while the Court differed on the result's reason-
ing.'" Quirin manifests the wartime setting when, for instance, na-
tional security interests have eroded, and often trumped, civil
liberties.' 76 The opinion also reflects improper exogenous pressures,
most critically from Roosevelt, to legitimize rapid trial, prompt con-
viction, and grave punishment, 77 as well as internal ones, mainly from
Justice Frankfurter, 78 who later admitted Quiin was "not a happy
precedent.', 79 Twenty years after the case issued, Justice Douglas be-
moaned the experience as showing "all of us that it is extremely un-
desirable to announce a decision on the merits without an opinion
accompanying it. Because once [we] search for the
grounds, ... sometimes those grounds crumble."' s  Moreover, the
decision was exceptional, very narrow, and should be restricted to its
unusual facts.'" Many observers have suggested that Quiin be sharply
173 Id. at 18.
174 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 659 (1956); see also
Danelski, supra note 111, at 72.
1 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
176 See generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990) (ana-
lyzing the tension between national security and civil liberties); TRIBE, supra note 102, § 4-6, at
670 (declaring that presidential authority broadens during times of war); Earl Warren, The Bill
of Rights and the Militay, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 191-93 (1962) (discussing briefly that decisions
in wartime are often "abhorrent" in view of normal judicial, peace-time decisions). Justice Jack-
son even said the Court had exceeded its authority. See Danelski, supra note 111 (citing Memo-
randum from Justice Robert H. Jackson (Oct. 23, 1942), Box 124, Robert H. Jackson Papers,
Library of Congress).
177 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6, at 50-53 (describing Roosevelt's various responses to mili-
tary tribunals); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 42, at 1291 (arguing that the pressures on the Court
warranted reconsideration); supra notes 119-34 (recounting President Roosevelt's opinion re-
garding swift punishment of the "saboteurs").
178 Most notable was Frankfurter. See supra note 144 (indicating his concern about the Quirin
case); see also sources cited supra note 144.
7. Danelski, supra note 111 at 80 (quoting Memorandum of Justice Felix Frankfurter (June
4, 1953), Box 65, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School); see also id. (commenting on
criticisms of the Quirin decision); White, supra note 144, at 436 (examining Frankfurter's
qualms about Quirin).
180 Interviews by Walter F. Murphy with Justice William 0. Douglas, U.S. Supreme Court
(June 9, 1962) (transcript on file with Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Univ.)
(discussing the "patient negotiation" that accompanied the Quirin decision); see also Danelski,
supra note 111, at 80.
SeeExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1942) ("We hold only that those particular acts con-
stitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military
commission."). Other opinions have articulated the precept that the Court should draft opin-
ions narrowly. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (dis-
cussing the judicial practice of "dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way");
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confined, and a few have analogized the opinion to Korematsu v.
United States,11 the discredited ruling which validated internment of
Japanese Americans.
183
b. Additional Reasons for Limiting Quirin
There are other major ways in which Quirin is limited, essentially
warranting the determination's consignment to an archaic Second
World War relic, which offers minimal support for the recently-
instituted punishment regimes. It is important to understand that
the time period in which the Supreme Court resolved Quirin ante-
dated the dramatic growth of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence,
criminal procedure safeguards, and international and human rights
law.
i. Habeas Corpus
Careful evaluation of Quirin and its historical context undermines
the assertion by numerous Bush administration officials that the Jus-
tices only scrutinized whether the military tribunal's jurisdiction was
lawful.' 4  The Court framed the issues vis-A-vis commission jurisdic-
tion over the saboteurs and the alleged offenses, but the Justices
clearly exercised jurisdiction and proceeded to resolve on the merits
petitioners' substantive claims that tribunal procedures violated their
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and the Articles of War. More-
over, the litigants' broad factual stipulation obviated any need for ju-
dicial inquiry regarding those facts or their proof.185  However, even if
the Quirin Court merely treated jurisdiction in the narrowest sense,186the decision could not justify analogous confinement of federal
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-61 (1981) (commenting on the necessity to de-
termine the validity of presidential action on the narrowest possible grounds).
182 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming an order excluding people of Japanese ancestry from a
military area during World War II because of the threat to national security).
183 See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 42, at 1290-91 (comparing Quiin to Korematsu to demon-
strate why the case should be discounted as precedent); Turley, supra note 119, at A17 (discuss-
ing how Quiin is the "sister case" to Korematsu); see also Warren, supra note 176, at 193-94 n.33
(comparing Quiin and Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (regarding a Russian army
colonel apprehended in New York who was granted a full civilian trial and the protections of
the Bill of Rights, in terms of military jurisdiction).
184 See supra notes 150-83 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's decision in Quirin
and explaining the various issues addressed by the Court).
185 See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (observing
that the precedential significance of Quifin was limited by the parties' factual stipulation).
1I recognize that the Court did not scrutinize the substantive claims against and defenses of
the petitioners or the procedures used to test them, mainly because the parties agreed that such
review was beyond the Court's capacity given the case's temporal context. See supra notes 150-
51 and accompanying text (describing the Court's capacity, given the time restraints).
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judicial review, which scrutinizes detention or punishment under the
Bush Order. Assuming arguendo that Quiin mandated circum-
scribed review, this feature must be updated to reflect the substantial
evolution of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence in the six decades
following Quiin's issuance.
The law which governed the scope of federal habeas corpus scru-
tiny in 1942, the year Quiin issued, cabined review. 87 Federal courts,
in habeas proceedings then and since the nation's founding, essen-
tially undertook a 'jurisdictional inquiry," so conviction by a court
with valid jurisdiction ended the dispute.' It was not until the 1950s
that the Justices abandoned this restricted habeas corpus jurispru-
dence and began its profound expansion, 89 which means today the
writ is generally available for remedying constitutional mistakes which
infect convictions. 190
ii. International Legal Developments
The second principal way that Quiin is limited reflects the strik-
ingly underdeveloped condition of international law, as well as of
187 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 166, at 1364-68 (assessing debate over the writ's scope).
Leading, and often diverse, views on this history include WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE
GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The
Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992); Lewis
Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court As Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31
(1965); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451
(1966); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Copus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579
(1982); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993).
198 There are several lead cases for the "jurisdictional rule" in Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193,
203, 3 Pet. 119, 126 (1830). See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (remanding a de-
nial of a habeas petition to determine if the right to counsel was waived); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923) (reversing a denial of a habeas petition); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371
(1879) (holdingjurisdiction over a writ because the petition was appellate in nature).
189 Typical is Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), which affirmed denial of petitions for ha-
beas relief. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 10.4-10.5, at 682-86 (4th ed.
2003) (tracing the history of habeas corpus law); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus:
Part III-Brown v. Allen: The Habeas Corpus Revolution That Wasn't, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1541 (2000)
(providing an historical analysis of habeas corpus jurisprudence). Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S.
101 (1942), which allowed for the use of writs in cases where conviction violated the accused's
constitutional rights and the writ is the only effective means of preserving rights, may have de-
parted from Watkins, but case law and commentary at the time suggest otherwise. See Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) (denying habeas corpus petition and adhering to jurisdictional ap-
proach); Alexander Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U. L. REV. 26,
40-46 (1945) (discussing how, although the Supreme Court expanded the scope of habeas peti-
tions, it adhered to certain fundamental principles).
190 A classic example is Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), which held that failure to appeal a
conviction did not require a denial of a habeas petition. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 189, §
10.5.2, at 690.
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global human rights law, when the determination issued.'9 ' For in-
stance, the World War II-era opinion predates the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the Geneva
Conventions, treaties to which the United States is a party, as well as
long-established doctrines of customary international law respecting
due process. These factors show that the detentions and military
commission rules ignore numerous procedural safeguards in the
ICCPR, may violate the Geneva Conventions, and could infringe
upon due process strictures in human rights law.
c. Guanteinamo Bay Detention Cases
Judges might have improperly resolved some litigation which chal-
lenged the Guantdinamo Bay detentions, or at most the cases warrant
narrow application. In Al Odah v. United States,12 the D.C. Circuit
broadly read Johnson v. Eisentrager9 3 which should be confined to its
unusual facts that implicated a declared war and military tribunals
Congress specifically authorized for prosecutions in a war zone, while
the mid-twentieth century time frame preceded the vast growth of in-
ternational and humanitarian law canvassed above. '94 However, the
Ninth Circuit's determinations that Eisentrager did not preclude its
exercise of jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition or mandate
sovereignty, rather than territorial jurisdiction, as well as its findings
that the Guantinamo lease, the treaty, and pragmatic realities mean
195the base is sovereign territory for habeas purposes, apparently com
port better with modern understandings of habeas corpus, interna-
tional, and human rights law.
96
191 See Cole, supra note 1; Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1421-32 (detailing international laws
regarding procedural protections that secret detentions and proposed procedures for military
commissions ignore); Koh, supra note 3, at 338-39 (arguing that the military order undermines
the concept of separation of powers).
192 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.) (rejecting ha-
beas petitions for lack of citizenship).
193 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950) (holding that a habeas petition was properly dismissed because
'the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an immunity from military tri-
als and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war
with the United States").
194 See supra notes 38, 191 and accompanying text (discussing the Eisentrager case and the
state of international and humanitarian law). Because Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d
1153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003) (mem.), did not reach detainment's
merits, it warrants no additional treatment here. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
19s Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003); Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d 1153.
1 See supra notes 39, 187-91 and accompanying text (detailing the jurisprudence of habeas
corpus, international and human rights law). The district judge thus far has resolved the vexing
Moussaoui case rather well. See United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003),
affd in part and vacated in part, No. 03-4792, 2004 WL 868261 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2004); supra note
40 and accompanying text.
1146 (Vol. 6:5
PUNISHMENT AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
d. Summay
Indefinite detentions and military tribunals undermine the rule of
law at home by flouting basic constitutional protections and, globally,
by eroding international law tenets. For example, the commission
proceedings will limit defendants' rights in terms of what the Consti-
tution normally guarantees for civilian trials while affording fewer
safeguards than courts martial. Illustrative are the lack of provision
for jury trials and the privilege against self-incrimination, lenient
rules governing evidentiary burdens, proof and verdicts, and the po-
tential to close trials. The detentions concomitantly have violated,
and tribunals will undercut, major treaties to which the United States
is a signatory19 7 and essential aspects of customary international law,
such as due process requirements. Moreover, indefinitely detaining
individuals and trying suspects in commissions resemble behavior for
which America has castigated others and, thus, damage global rela-
tions by making the United States appear hypocritical.
B. Additional Reasons Why Reliance Is Misplaced
Reliance on indefinite detentions and tribunals is misplaced for
numerous reasons which complement and augment the legal ones
surveyed earlier. Dependence on practical and policy contentions to
suspend the rules, which typically govern adjudication of criminal re-
sponsibility, is unwise and may well be counterproductive. Advocates
of detentions and tribunals, who find law to be an inconvenience and
even dangerous, champion pragmatic ideas.9 For instance, propo-
nents assert that federal court trials impose too great temporal and
monetary expense, as well as risk on judges and jurors, that terrorists
deserve no protections, that the evidence available fails to meet strict
requirements and must be kept secret for national security purposes,
and that detentions and military tribunals accord the government
necessary control.
However, compliance with the letter of United States and interna-
tional law and reliance on domestic and global legal process-in the
form of entities, such as federal courts and international tribunals,
and procedures, namely, due process and other constitutional safe-
guards-will advance near- and long-term American strategic inter-
ests at home, but especially in the new sociopolitical context
197 See, e.g., Int'l Convention on Civil and Political Rights, adopted, United Nations General
Assembly Res. 2200A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, in force Mar. 23, 1976.
198I rely here and in the remainder of this paragraph on sources cited supra notes 2-20 and
accompanying text, which examine the circumstances surrounding the Quirin case in terms of
military commissions and detentions.
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produced by world terrorism. 9 Dependence on international legal
process will: help galvanize the world coalition the United States
needs to resist terrorism effectively; promote terrorists' apprehen-
sion, arrest, and prosecution; foster protection of Americans overseas;
establish the crime's international nature and isolate al Qaeda; facili-
tate development of global norms for terrorism; and increase the
perceived legitimacy of United States governmental actions.
Use of detentions and tribunals is also unwarranted because it im-
poses both disadvantages that resemble those identified earlier and
additional detriments. Most significantly, the practices have not ac-
counted for their harmful consequences. Detaining thousands of
Muslim and Arab men in the United States and 650 individuals ab-
sent process at Guantd.namo Bay has seriously infringed civil rights,
and trials before commissions promise to have similar effects. The
measures' impacts have been, and will be, visited principally on
communities of color. Without trivializing this enormous human toll,
the detention of many individuals for protracted times has been fi-
nancially onerous. Moreover, the President's unilateral reliance on
detentions and creation of tribunals grants excessive authority to a
single governmental branch. The mechanisms, thus, have societal
costs for America domestically, because they erode treasured values,
including freedom and separated powers, and overseas, because they
jeopardize relations with other countries.
C. Summary by Way of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Proffering a reliable cost-benefit evaluation is difficult. Certain
phenomena, such as individual liberty and national security, are so
abstract that they defy quantification, while others, which seem more
tangible, cannot be reduced to precise amounts. Were calibration of
detriments and advantages easier, problems would still remain. Some
include identifying cause and effect linkages between these costs and
benefits, as well as between detentions and tribunals, guaranteeing
the accuracy of the yardsticks used, and striking a balance that in-
volves commensurables. For example, if the measure of success is
preventing attacks within the United States since September 11, the
devices have apparently been effective. However, when the yardstick
19 See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1435, 1445-66 (examining the United States' role in inter-
national law in light of the increased emphasis on terrorism); Koh, supra note 3 (indicating
skepticism about the international community's ability to overcome political obstacles and the
effectiveness of military commissions); Turley, supra note 1, at 743-48 (analyzing the bases for
the use of military tribunals in the war on terrorism); see also David Cole, The New McCarthyism:
Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (2003) (describing the
United States' response to the September 11th attacks in a historical context and the use of the
criminal system and its safeguards in dealing with terrorism).
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applied is stopping terrorism worldwide or in the Middle East, or fos-
tering civil liberties, success appears less clear. Nonetheless, the ma-
jor disadvantages and benefits can be estimated and compared.
The novel and controversial punishment regimes have offered a
few advantages. For instance, the systems may have partially realized
their chief functional justifications; namely, protecting national and
global security, deterring terrorist activities, and making progress in
the war on terrorism. The measures could have helped preclude
strikes on American territory since September 11 and might have
stopped or reduced terrorism elsewhere, particularly in Afghanistan
and Iraq, although these notions are contested.
Even if the schemes have afforded certain benefits, including the
prevention of terrorist attacks within the United States, the regimes
have entailed substantial detriments, many of which I considered
above. The systems have not attended to their deleterious impacts.
Holding thousands with little process has violated the individuals'
rights, and these detentions have required gigantic fiscal expendi-
tures. Prosecutions before military commissions will similarly affect
defendants' civil liberties, while unilateral executive institution of the
detentions and tribunals has accorded one branch too much power.
The mechanisms concomitantly disadvantage the United States at
home, by undermining cherished ideals, and abroad, by threatening
relationships with many states. Numerous assessed propositions,
therefore, show that the regimes' costs outweigh their benefits, while
the schemes have minuscule future viability and could warrant elimi-
nation or at least sharp curtailment.
In sum, basic aspects of the war on terrorism, namely detentions
and military tribunals, comprise unique and disputed punishment
systems. The regimes' adverse impacts, especially vis-A-vis civil liber-
ties, outstrip the techniques' benefits, particularly those that involve
security. A number of Bush administration officials and judges corre-
spondingly misplaced reliance on domestic precedent, such as Quirin,
when they instituted or approved the measures. This Article's final
section, thus, offers recommendations to address the issues that the
schemes and concomitant terrorism litigation have presented and will
raise.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Because the detriments imposed by the novel, controversial pun-
ishment regimes eclipse their advantages, President Bush and Con-
gress should terminate, or substantially restrict, the use of indefinite
detentions and military commissions. If the administration and law-
makers find these suggestions unpalatable because, for example, they
deem national and global security interests more compelling than
civil liberties, executive and judicial branch officials should accord
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relevant case law the kind of nuanced treatment surveyed earlier and
particularized below.
A. Reconsidering the Punishment Systems
1. Bush Administration
a. Military Tribunals
Many ideas canvassed above demonstrate that the President must
seriously reconsider his unilateral assertion of executive power to de-
tain thousands of individuals for lengthy periods and to create mili-
tary tribunals. The administration might proceed in ways that would
basically rescind these devices, circumscribe the techniques, or more
narrowly tailor the approaches to various factual scenarios. A thresh-
old issue that deserves exploration is whether the commissions trench
so much on fundamental American values of liberty and separated
powers that the tribunals warrant abrogation. Information reviewed
earlier arguably suggests that commissions should be disbanded, al-
though numerous observers, most pertinently in the executive and
legislative branches, may consider this solution radical and unrealis-
tic.
It is impossible to offer guidance that definitively treats the broad
spectrum of circumstances that will arise, while properly balancing
the multifarious relevant phenomena. However, in general, the ad-
ministration should deploy a finely-calibrated evaluation, which at-
tempts to maximize national security, civil liberties, separation of
powers, and financial economies. One more specific illustration
would be a presumption that requires federal court trials for indi-
viduals suspected of terrorism except when these prosecutions would
clearly jeopardize national security and, thus, warrant the use of a
military tribunal.00 Related ideas include the availability and ostensi-
ble efficacy of techniques, such as document redaction and in camera
hearings, which would minimize the worst aspects of the forum
choice. Other examples are the myriad, innovative approaches de-
vised by the trial judges who had responsibility for the federal court
proceedings that implicated Hamdi, Moussaoui and Padilla. °'
200 The government might be required to convince an Article III judge that the government
needs to proceed in a military tribunal and to satisfy a test that is stricter than the "some evi-
dence" standard applied in terrorism litigation to date. See supra text accompanying note 35;
infra note 233 and accompanying text (demonstrating the deferential standard in Padilla). I am
not impugning the integrity of this administration or future ones that may understandably have
greater concern for national security than civil liberties.
201 See supra notes 31-36, 40, 196; infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text (recounting the
reasoning behind the Hamdi, Moussaoui, and Padilla decisions). I appreciate that the Fourth
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Insofar as the administration chooses to try defendants before
military commissions, which federal judges hold valid, it should reas-
sess the strictures the Bush and DOD Orders prescribed 20 2 and refor-
mulate them in ways that will enhance safeguards such as due proc-
ess, as well as the rights to counsel and against self-incrimination,
which the Constitution affords and which are recognized by interna-
tional or human rights law.2 0 3  Two valuable sources inform these
mandates' reexamination and possible recalibration. One is Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment guarantees that modem federal courts
articulate as well as proof burdens, evidentiary requirements, and
other protections which they now impose. A second source includes
bills introduced during 2002 and 2003 that specifically authorize mili-
tary tribunals.0 4 Limiting commission invocation and elaborating the
safeguards granted would help address United States and interna-
tional concerns related to civil liberties and domestic ones about
separated powers.
b. Detentions
The Bush administration must also consider and implement
mechanisms which rectify or temper the harmful effects of detaining
numerous individuals for prolonged times. Executive Branch offi-
cials should use a carefully-tuned assessment which implicates the
risks to national security, civil liberties, separated powers, and fiscal
integrity in proceeding, as well as the availability and effectiveness of
measures that remedy or confine those dangers. 05 For instance, the
DOJ might evaluate trying Hamdi and Padilla in federal courts
or, perhaps, before military tribunals, °5 although these ideas'
Circuit rejected the district judge's approach in Hamd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003). More-
over, the tortured Moussaoui litigation may undercut my ideas, but the case is extraordinary,
and the district judge seems fair and diligent. This overall approach is based on federal courts'
comparative advantage, especially vis-A-vis protecting civil liberties, over military tribunals, but it
recognizes that national security concerns may trump them, when necessary.
M See supra note 2 and accompanying text (documenting the DOD Order).
203 See supra note 191 and accompanying text (examining international and human rights
law).
See supra note 78 and accompanying text (analyzing a proposal that would accord greater
protections than did the Bush Order). Insofar as the Bush and DOD Orders' prescriptions do
not bind military tribunal judges, they should implement this guidance.
205 I envision refined application of the analysis presented supra note 200 and accompanying
text, which requires a stricter evidentiary standard for individuals charged with terrorism. Of
course, insofar as the administration is using practices that violate the rule of law, it must cease
doing so. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (documenting the recent issues regard-
ing detention after September 11).
206 The Bush Order's terms, which apply to non-citizens, may not permit this, as Hamdi and
Padilla are United States citizens. See sources cited supra note 2 (describing the DOD Order);
see also supra notes 19, 23-36 and accompanying text (explaining the Hamdi and Padilla cases).
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effectuation will await High Court resolution of their cases. 20 ' The
government should think about continuing with the trial of Mous-
saoui, as limited by the district judge, in federal court, or attempt to
prosecute the defendant before a military commission2
The administration must correspondingly institute efforts that will
facilitate treatment of many others whom it has detained. The gov-
ernment could use an analogous evaluation of risks and ameliorative
techniques. 20 9 For example, the DOD and the DOJ should determine
the appropriateness of prosecuting numerous additional individuals
held at Guantdinamo before military tribunals or even federal courts,
while enhancing detainees' safeguards, namely, greater access to
counsel. The DOJ must also invoke a similar analysis to process more
expeditiously the thousands of Muslims and Arabs it has held by de-
ciding whether they should be charged and tried and, if so, in what
forum.
2. Congress
Insofar as the Bush administration eschews these recommenda-
tions, Senate and House members should assess and implement
them. For instance, Congress might directly treat a number of ques-
tions that the unilaterally-instituted military tribunals pose. It could
enact legislation which would specifically authorize the commissions
and introduce new, or augment present, safeguards that implicate ar-
eas, such as burdens of proof, evidentiary mandates, and verdict.
210
Lawmakers could also pass bills which would remedy or ameliorate
indefinite detentions' worst features. A related, promising approach
would be scrutinizing and eliminating or curtailing those USA
PATRIOT Act sections that govern detentions, which most erode civil
liberties when Congress reauthorizes the legislation that it hastily
adopted in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
207 The government recently accorded Hamdi and Padilla access to counsel. See supra note
29 (discussing Hamdi's access to counsel); Michael Powell, Lauyer Visits 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at A10 (noting that Padilla was permitted to meet with counsel for
the first time since President Bush declared him an enemy combatant in 2002). Courts might
apply the safeguards developed by the district judge in Padilla. See supra note 36 and accompa-
nying text; infra note 237 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 40, 196, 201 and accompanying text.
209 I envision refined application of the analyses presented supra notes 200, 205 and accom-
panying text.
210 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 53-54, 58-60 and accompanying text.
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3. Bush Administration and Congress
President Bush and Congress should individually and jointly con-
sider alternatives that threaten civil liberties and separated powers
less, yet foster national security to the same degree as present proce-
dures. One valuable example would be implementing some type of
international tribunal. 12 The United States might advocate the crea-
tion of a new institution or the expansion of present tribunal jurisdic-
tion. Related options could be internationalized military commis-
sions or a hybrid domestic/international court that would receive
United Nations help and be attached to peacekeeping forces in Af-
ghanistan or Iraq where it would sit.
President Bush as well as Senate and House members may reject
these suggestions because, for instance, they think that the recom-
mendations underemphasize national and global security considera-
tions and overstate the need to protect civil liberties. If the chief ex-
ecutive and lawmakers do not adopt these ideas, judges should
evaluate and implement the concepts below in resolving litigation
which implicates terrorism.
B. Terrorism Litigation
1. Military Commissions
When the Bush administration actually prosecutes someone in the
military tribunal and that individual challenges its constitutionality,
the federal judge who entertains the case should resolve the matter
pursuant to numerous principles. Most important, the President
does not have authority to eliminate federal court jurisdiction, a
judgment compelled by the Constitution and Youngstown,' although
military commissions may be valid in particular contexts, namely, ex-
traterritorial prosecutions that result from declared wars. Articles I
and III of the Constitution, in clear terms, state that Congress, not
the Executive, is the political branch with power to establish federal
courts and prescribe their jurisdiction.1 ' Youngstown is concomitantly
the controlling precedent. The majority opinion concludes that the
President lacks authority to legislate in areas specifically delegated
to Congress, even in national emergencies, while the major
212 See Dickinson, supra note 1; Koh, supra note 3.
213 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
214 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 2 ("The Congress shall have the power... [t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("[T]he supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction ... with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.").
215 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-89.
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concurrence finds this power at its nadir when invoked absent an ex-
plicit grant and against clearly-stated legislative will.2 16 Quirin corre-
spondingly warrants quite narrow application. The Court did not re-
solve whether the chief executive acting alone could institute military
tribunals but premised its decision that the Roosevelt Commission
was valid mainly on Congress's war declaration and its explicit au-
thorization for tribunals in the Articles of War.217 Other phenomena,
including the case's peculiar facts, its confined holding, and the war-
time context, require Quirin's sharp limitation. In short, the Consti-
tution and Youngstown dictate the conclusion that the Chief Executive
lacks power to nullify federal jurisdiction or to deny individuals ac-
cused of terrorism access to federal court.
2. Detentions and Related War on Terrorism Litigation
When federal judges address war on terrorism litigation, especially
implicating detentions, they should resolve these cases pursuant to
several essential tenets. Most important, courts should recognize that
the Bush administration and a few judges have invoked Quirin for
concepts, such as broad judicial deference to Executive Branch de-
tentions, which the opinion does not support, and must cabin its ap-
plication for numerous reasons. First, Quirin involved unique facts
that were basically uncontested. 8 Second, a number of phenomena
make the determination and its legal analysis vulnerable to criti-
cism. 2 9 Moreover, ChiefJustice Stone, in his majority opinion, inten-
tionally and expressly limited the decision, its legal evaluation, and
the holding, while the Justices could not agree on a rationale.22 °
Courts should also reject Quirin's expansive invocation for notions,
such as judicial acquiescence to presidential detentions. They must
recognize that the Court exercised jurisdiction, despite the Roosevelt
proclamation which purportedly barred it, while the Justices resolved
on the merits petitioners' substantive claims under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments and the Articles of War.
Quirin also deserves narrow application because the case's 1942 is-
suance substantially preceded burgeoning growth in federal habeas
corpus law. Federal judges must appreciate that the writ's expansion
by the Supreme Court has modified Quiin and should clearly reject
this antiquated feature of the opinion in treating the federal habeas
petitions the Bush Order will generate. Habeas corpus' 60-year
216 See supra notes 95-101 (discussing Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence).
217 ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
218 See id. at 20-22.
29 See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
220 See 317 U.S. at 47-48.
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development, which means the writ issues to prisoners confined un-
der judgments that violate the Constitution, together with the Warren
Court's broadened interpretation of federal constitutional protec-
tions accorded criminal defendants, substantially alter federal habeas
jurisdiction's character and import. Illustrative of contemporary fed-
eral habeas' usage are allegations that state-appointed counsel fur-
nished ineffective assistance 2  and that police secured self-
incriminating statements in violation of the requirements imposed by
Miranda v. Arizona.222
These examples of the writ's modem application do not necessar-
ily mean that a defendant whom a military tribunal lawfully tries will
have those or other constitutional protections. However, a federal
court that exercises jurisdiction over a habeas petition of someone
tried in a commission does possess the requisite authority for decid-
ing on the merits constitutional challenges to tribunal operation and
must not be stymied by an outmoded allusion to Quirin. A party,
thus, might claim that admission of questionable evidence contra-
vened the individual's Fifth Amendment right to "due process of
law, 22 3 or that the person's conviction lacked support in constitution-
ally adequate evidence224 or was premised on self-incriminating state-
ments procured in a coercive manner.225 The lax evidentiary criteria
that the DOD Order provides mean that litigants promise to raise
these issues. 6 However, defendants will pursue many additional
questions, while federal judges facing the issues in the context of a
habeas corpus petition otherwise within their statutory jurisdiction
should resolve them and must not be deterred by anachronistic ref-
erences to Quirin.
Quirin, thus, prescribes meaningful federal court review to the
greatest extent allowed by relevant habeas corpus law while carefully
2 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (finding ineffective assistance in a capital
case); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (determining respondent had received
grossly ineffective assistance).
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that prosecutors may not use statements made during cus-
todial interrogation unless the defendant was first advised of his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to counsel); see also, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993)
(finding that inculpatory statements were made in violation of Miranda).
223 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The defendant might specifically claim that the evidence was in-
herently unreliable or that there was no meaningful opportunity for cross examination. Ad-
ministration reliance on ex parte affidavits in Hamdi and Padilla may presage their use in
commissions. See Cole, supra note 1, at 977.
224 See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 229 (2001) (concluding that the defendant's conviction
failed to satisfy constitutional demands because the state "presented no evidence whatsoever" to
prove a basic element of the crime).
225 See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 708 ("Involuntariness [of self-incriminating statements] requires
coercive state action, such as trickery, psychological pressure, or mistreatment.").
See DOD ORDER, supra note 2, § 6(D) (1) (providing that evidence shall be admitted if it
"would have probative value to a reasonable person").
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warning against unjustified judicial intrusion in executive national se-
curity actions. Notwithstanding the Justices' appreciation of the war-
time situation in which they ruled, the Court deemed resolving con-
stitutional attacks on the presidential initiative compatible with its
judicial role.
Another reason why federal judges should treat Quirin narrowly is
that the opinion's 1942 timing preceded the great expansion in in-
ternational and human rights law that occurred over the subsequent
six decades.v For example, judges should enforce, when applicable,
the obligations imposed by international treaties to which the United
States is a party. Courts could also invoke the due process strictures
which have evolved in international humanitarian law since 1942.
The war on terrorism litigation to date provides concrete exam-
ples of these ideas. In Hamdi, for instance, even the Fourth Circuit,
which has most solicitously read Quirin, appeared to denigrate the
government's argument that "courts may not second-guess the mili-
tary's determination that an individual is an enemy combatant and
should be detained" because judges have a "constitutionally limited
role."228 The appellate court initially restated the ideas by observing
that the United States "submits that we may not review at all its desig-
nation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant-that its de-
terminations on this score are the first and final word,, 229 and then re-
jected the government's motion to dismiss: "In dismissing, we
ourselves would be summarily embracing a sweeping proposition-
namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen
alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely
without charges or counsel on the government's say-so.,
2 30
District Judge Robert Doumar, who first entertained the Hamdi
petition, narrowly viewed Quirin and eschewed the DOJ's reliance on
it. "[B]efore the government had time to respond to the [habeas]
petition, the district court appointed.., counsel for the detainee[,]
ordered the government to allow [him] unmonitored access to
Hamdi [,],23 and "intimated that the government was possibly hiding
disadvantageous information from the court[,]" ordering it to pro-
vide considerable material assembled on Hamdi.232 Judge Doumar
227 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 32-33 (discussing the
Padilla district court's choice nonetheless to apply Quirin).
228 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting from the government's
brief).
Id.
230 Id. But see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (referencing the analysis used by the
Padilla district court).
231 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003).
232 Id. at 462. These events occurred during an August 2002 hearing. To be sure, the Fourth
Circuit rejected these actions. Id. at 476.
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also closely reviewed President Bush's designation of Hamdi as an
enemy combatant because that label has such dire effects. The trial
"court asserted that it was 'challenging everything in the Mobbs' dec-
laration' and that it intended to 'pick it apart' 'piece by
piece' . . . [repeatedly] referr[ing] to information it felt was miss-
ing[,]" and issued an opinion which concluded the declaration fell
"'far short' of supporting Hamdi's detention."2 3 3 The Fourth Circuit
believed these efforts to be overly rigorous; however, the district
judge's approach may have been preferable to the appellate scrutiny
that was so minimalist as to constitute "no meaningful judicial re-
view.",
2 34
The Second Circuit treatment of presidential authority to desig-
nate United States citizens enemy combatants in Padilla, which relied
on Youngtown's analytical framework, while honoring, but not acqui-
escing in, executive prerogatives, concomitantly seemed better than
the Fourth Circuit's disposition of the analogous question in Hamdi.
235
The trial court that earlier decided Padilla correspondingly acknowl-
edged that Quirin offered "no guidance regarding the standard to be
applied in making the threshold determination that a habeas corpus
petitioner is an unlawful combatant... [b] ecause the facts in Quifin
were stipulated. 2 36 The judge also ruled that Padilla should have ac-
cess to counsel and imposed conditions, which the court apparently
thought were warranted for the protection of national security.
The Ninth Circuit's resolution of the issues presented by the
Guantdnamo detentions3 8 also seemed preferable to the D.C. Cir-
23s Id. at 462. A concomitant ofJudge Doumar's approach would be imposing a review stan-
dard for these designations that is stricter than the quite lenient "some evidence" criterion that
the district judge articulated and used in Padilla. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
24 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283; see supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing the
Fourth Circuit's analysis in Hamdi).
235 See supra notes 25-30, 37, 229-34 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' varying
treatment of defendants Hamdi and Padilla). Differential treatment may reflect critical factual
distinctions, as the Second Circuit and Fourth Circuit judges carefully observed. See Padilla ex
rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 711 (2d Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit
that comparing the "battlefield capture" of Hamdi in Afghanistan "to the domestic arrest" of
Padilla at O'Hare Airport in Chicago "is to compare apples and oranges" (quoting Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003))), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (mem.).
2S Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942) (stating that facts were stipulated by counsel).
237 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 610 ("Padilla may consult with counsel.., under conditions
that will minimize the likelihood that he can use his lawyers as unwilling intermediaries for the
transmission of information to others.. . ."); see supra note 36 and accompanying text. This
seems preferable to allowing detainees, such as Hamdi, to languish in military prisons pending
the conflict's end.
238 See Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d
1153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2073 (2003) (mem.).
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cuit's treatment.239 For instance, the Ninth Circuit's rather narrow in-
240
terpretation of Johnson v. Eisentrage ° and its flexible approach to ha-
beas corpus jurisdiction more accurately reflected contemporary ha-
beas' breadth, the dramatic growth of international and human
rights law, and pragmatic realities.241
CONCLUSION
Specific dimensions of the war on terrorism impose new and con-
troversial punishment systems. The Bush administration's reliance
on indefinite detentions and establishment of military tribunals have
undermined and will contravene the rule of law domestically and in-
ternationally. This dependence inflicts societal costs on the United
States both at home, by eroding venerable ideals-namely, separated
powers and civil liberties-and abroad, by straining relations with
numerous countries. If President Bush and Congress follow the rec-
ommendations above, they may threaten civil liberties less and be
able to protect national security as well.
239 See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 534
(2003) (mem.); see also supra notes 38-39, 194-96 and accompanying text.
240 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
241 See id.; supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 6:5
